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INTERNATIONAL PARALLEL LITIGATION:
DISPOSITION OF DUPLICATIVE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN
Yoshimasa Furutat
Abstract: Although duplicative proceedings involve various negative effects, if
motivated by legitimate reasons, parallel litigation may be justified. Therefore,
regulation of international parallel litigation should be based on a close examination of
the legitimacy of the litigants' motives, which should then be balanced against negative
effects. In this comparative study of the parallel litigation practice in the United States
and Japan, the contrast between the two countries is attributed to the underlying
differences in each country's social and legal traditions. Despite the differences in their
practice, however, each legal system offers a model that may be successfully adopted by
the other for fair and efficient international parallel litigation practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent expansion of transnational economic activities has given
rise to an increasing number of international business disputes. Not infre-
quently, international business disputes fall in the adjudicatory jurisdiction
of multiple nations or jurisdictions,' where parties find themselves litigating
overlapping issues in multiple forums.
International parallel litigation consists of the virtually same disputes
being litigated simultaneously in courts of multiple jurisdictions, one in a
domestic court and the other in a foreign court. 2 The international parallel
litigation practice is under substantive development, and the rules are
changing rapidly. Yet there is no one authoritative organization or compre-
hensive set of international conventions, rules, or practices regarding
international parallel litigation. Instead, each jurisdiction imposes its own
rules and practices that tend to restrict parallel litigation.
I See Israel Leshem, Forum Non Conveniens and Beyond: Judicial Intervention in the Choice of
Forum in Multinational Litigation 275 (1985) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School)
("[Tlhe trend has been for quite some time in the direction of expanding the available forums for plaintiffs
to sue in."). In Gau Shan, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that "[t]he modem era is one of world economic
interdependence, and economic interdependence requires cooperation and comity between nations. In an
increasingly international market, commercial transactions involving players from multiple nations have
become commonplace. Every one of these transactions presents the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction in
the courts of the nations of the parties involved concerning any dispute arising in the transaction." Gau
Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354 (6th Cir. 1992).
2 See, e.g., Interstate Material Corp. v. Chicago, 847 F.2d 1285, 1288 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[S]uit is
'parallel' when substantially the same parties are litigating substantially the same issues in another
forum."), quoting Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mutual Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1229 n. I (7th
Cir. 1979).
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As a threshold matter, one might ask why parallel litigation should be
restricted. Those advocating restriction cite three undesirable effects:
financial burden, waste ofjudicial resources, and contradictory judgments.
First, the parties are forced to bear the added costs in bringing multi-
ple proceedings in different courts.3 The burden will be especially onerous
on an individual plaintiff bringing a tort action in her home forum under a
contingent fee arrangement. If she has to defend a mirror image declaratory
action in a foreign forum, she would be forced to bear a great financial bur-
den she probably cannot afford, and eventually she may be forced to
abandon her claim. Second, parallel litigation consumes judicial resources
in multiple jurisdictions. Docket congestion and resulting delays are a
major problem in most jurisdictions. 4 Further, when both litigations reach
final judgments, there is no assurance that such judgments will be consistent
with each other.5 The practical inconvenience of this is especially intoler-
able in domestic relations matters, such as divorce litigation. Thus, there
are good reasons for restricting parallel litigation. 6
Under certain circumstances, however, litigants may have legitimate
motivations that can justify a parallel litigation. It is the thesis of this article
that regulation of parallel litigation should consist of balancing the undesir-
able effects against the extent of the legitimacy of the motivations, 7 and that
a fair balancing can occur only if there is a degree of uniformity in the legal
system between the competing foreign courts.
There are a variety of possible ways and devices to facilitate the
interest-balancing approach in parallel litigation. As shown below, U.S. and
Japanese courts have developed their own frameworks to deal with parallel
litigation, both of which were developed under different historical back-
grounds.
3 Allan D. Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IOWA L. REV. II, 16 (1961) ("Reactive litigation with its
waste and duplication surely is an anomaly.").
4 Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicitive Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's
Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Prr-r. L. REV. 809, 811 (1989) ("Relitigating of identical issues
wastes scarce judicial resources .... ").
5 Tetsuya Obuchi, International Lis Pendens and Conflict of Judgments 4 (1987) (unpublished
LL.M. thesis, Harvard Law School); Takao Sawaki, Battle of Lawsuit-Lis Pendens in International
Relations, 23 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 17, 20 (1980) ("[Tlhe double institution of actions might result in a
conflict ofjudgments, which we should endeavor to avoid.").
6 See Vestal, supra note 3, at 15 ("The policy of the law generally seems to be that all facets of a
controversy should be tried in a single action.").
7 See Obuchi, supra note 5, at 69 ("Here, 'legitimate' interest means an interest worth being legally
protected, but it does not necessarily mean that this interest alone can justify the foreign lis pendens,
because we should balance the plaintiffs legitimate interest in initiating the second action with the
disadvantages that would be caused by initiating the second action.").
Nov. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
In this comparative study of international parallel litigation practices
in the United States and Japan,S emphasis will be placed on recent case law,
as well as legislative proposals. For each jurisdiction, this article will exam-
ine the contrast between the international practice and the respective
domestic parallel litigation practice. It will next compare and contrast the
U.S. and Japanese practices. This article ends with a discussion of an ideal
solution, as well as practical suggestions for establishing a workable
framework for regulating parallel litigation.
II. THE NATURE AND PRACTICE OF PARALLEL LITIGATION
Parallel litigations fall under two categories: "repetitive suits" 9 and
"reactive suits." 10  In a repetitive suit, the plaintiff in one litigation
commences another litigation in a different jurisdiction against the same
defendant, seeking the same kind of monetary payment or specific perform-
ance. In a reactive suit, the defendant in the first litigation commences the
second litigation in another court against the plaintiff in the first litigation,
typically seeking a mirror-image declaratory judgment.
In a repetitive suit, the plaintiff institutes parallel litigations in differ-
ent jurisdictions because (1) the defendant has assets in multiple
jurisdictions and the plaintiff wishes to eventually enforce the judgment in
all jurisdictions; 1 (2) the plaintiff believes the first litigation is proceeding
against her favor, and wishes to recover her disadvantage in the second liti-
gation in a different jurisdiction; (3) the plaintiff intends to harass the
defendant; 12 or (4) a combination of the foregoing.
In ordinary repetitive suits, a foreign judgment will be enforced only
if another jurisdiction recognizes and enforces it. Where the defendant is in
a critical financial condition, it would be too late if the plaintiff first obtains
the judgment in one jurisdiction and then proceeds to enforce it in another
8 For purposes of this article, U.S. practice shall be confined to federal practice only. State practice
as such will not be addressed.
9 Michael T. Gibson, Private Concurrent Litigation in Light of Younger, Pennzoil, and Colorado
River, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 185, 202-03 (1989); Allan D. Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L.
REv. 525, 525 (1960).
10 Gibson, supra note 9, at 196; Vestal, supra note 3, at II.
II Vestal, supra note 9, at 527 ("The plaintiff might start another action in a jurisdiction where
additional property can be found ....").
12 Id. at 526 ("It seems apparent that in many instances the plaintiffs have started a number of law
suits to harass the defendants. If actions are brought in a number of different jurisdictions, the defendant is
forced to hire additional attorneys and spend more time in handling the numerous law suits. Such
harassment might tend to force the defendant to settle.").
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jurisdiction. In such a case, the plaintiff is justified in instituting the repeti-
tive suit in multiple jurisdictions, where the defendant's assets are located.
Similarly, when the assets are located in the jurisdiction where the recogni-
tion and enforcement will not be available, or when it is feared that the
statute of limitations may run, it is necessary to bring a repetitive suit as a
parallel litigation.13
In contrast, courts do not readily recognize the need for recovering a
disadvantage in the first forum by instituting another suit in a different
forum. This is because once the plaintiff makes the mistake in choosing a
forum that is not favorable to her cause, resorting to parallel litigation,
which places on the defendant the burden of dual defense, will not be justi-
fied.14 Otherwise, the plaintiff would be encouraged to forum shop and to
try to obtain an advantage by multiple litigations of the same matter. 15
Similarly, the third concern, that of instituting a parallel litigation to harass
the defendant, is not legitimate, as civil litigation should not be a device for
harassment. 16
In a reactive suit, the defendant institutes the second litigation
because (1) she thinks the first forum is inadequate, or at least disadvanta-
geous, and wishes to dispute the case in a more favorable forum, 17 (2) she
simply intends to place the burden on the plaintiff in anticipation of a favor-
able settlement of the dispute, or (3) both of the above.
13 Obuchi, supra note 5, at 71-72 ("(1) when the institution of recognition of foreign judgment is not
available, the plaintiff may assert a legitimate interest ... (2) a plaintiff can have a legitimate interest ...
when getting enforcement judgment or their equivalents is very time-consuming or costly"'). In Inoue v.
K.K. Korean Air Line, the Tokyo District Court held that the parallel litigation should be permitted under a
certain circumstance because the judgment rendered in one country will not necessarily be enforceable in
another country. Interlocutory Judgment of June 23, 1987 (lnoue v. K.K. Korean Air Line), Tokyo District
Ct., 1240 HANREI JIH6 27, 639 HANREI TAIMUZU 253, summary English translation in 31 JAPANESE ANN.
INT'L L. 224 (1988).
14 Hajime Sakai, Kokusaiteki NiUj Kiso ni kansuru Kaishakuron K6satsu [Constructive Study
Concerning International Duplicative Suit], 829 HANREI TAIMUZU 39, 42 (1994). See also Caspian Invs.,
Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Deference to the suit first filed is
particularly appropriate where, as here, the plaintiff itself commenced the original suit.").
15 RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 147 (2d ed. 1992). See also
Obuchi, supra note 5, at 73 ("Usually the plaintiff does enjoy the opportunity to forum-shop. Allowing
him to institute the second action results in giving him additional opportunities to forum-shop. Therefore,
this o ortunity should not be given to the plaintiff of the first litigation without strong reason.").
oSee Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 n.15 (1981) (The forum non conveniens
dismissal "may be warranted where a plaintiff chooses a particular forum in order to harass the defendant
or to take advantage of favorable law."). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-
102(A)(l) (1981) (lawyers can be disciplined for taking actions designed simply to harass or maliciously
injure others).
17 Vestal, supra note 3, at 14 ("By starting a separate action the plaintiffcan initiate the action in his
choice of courts, where he thinks he will get the most favorable treatment.").
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The first concern regarding the adequacy of the forum is considered a
legitimate motivation.1 8 At the outset of a civil litigation, the plaintiff
usually has the choice of selecting the forum. She will select the most
favorable forum in terms of the availability of a jury trial, discovery,
contingent fee arrangements, conflict of law and other procedural rules,
convenience, and costs.19 Should the first concern regarding the adequacy
of the forum be held illegitimate, the defendant will more likely be
subjected to the plaintiff's choice of forum. That is, the parties may be
compelled to rush into a favorable court before the other party does, rather
than negotiating an amicable settlement.20 In contrast, the second concern
of placing the burden on the plaintiff to coerce a favorable settlement is
considered illegitimate, since it is not consistent with the principle of a fair
resolution of disputes.2 I
III. RULES AND PRACTICES IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS
A. Parallel Litigation within Federal Courts
Statute does not prohibit parallel proceedings within the U.S. federal
courts.22 There are, however, some statutory and other provisions which
may be useful in regulating parallel litigation among federal courts.
First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), addressing compulsory
counterclaims, requires a defendant in a federal action to state in a pleading
as a counterclaim any claim he may have against the plaintiff which arises
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plain-
tiff's claim. 23 The purpose of this provision is "to prevent multiplicity of
18 KAzuNoRi ISHIGURo, KOKUSAI MINJI FUNSO SHORI NO SHINSO [AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF
DISPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL DISPUTES] 101 (1993) (explicitly appreciating this concern).
19 Obuchi, supra note 5, at 74-75.
20 See Gibson, supra note 9, at 198 ("When both the initiating party and the reacting party have
related causes of action against the other, but different preferences as to which court should hear those
disputes, the reacting party is merely the party who lost the race to the courthouse.").
21 Gibson, supra note 9, at 196-98 ("The reactive party often is trying to vex or harass the original
plaintiff.... Reactive litigation generated by these illegitimate motives serves no useful purpose and often
creates significant problems.").
22 As stated above, the scope of this article will be confined to federal practices and will not cover
state practices. For parallel litigation among state courts, see generally George T. Conway III, The
Consolidation of Multistate Litigation in States Courts, 96 YALE L.J. 1099 (1987).
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) provides that: "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at
the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for
its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader
VOL. 5 No. I
Nov. 1995 INTERNATIONAL PARALLEL LITIGATION
actions and to achieve resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising
out of common matters.124
Second, if a federal court is convinced that another court is a more
convenient forum, the federal court can transfer its proceeding to the other
federal court.25 This allows "the consolidation of duplicative or related liti-
gation by transferring related cases to the same federal district." 26
Third, under the proper circumstances, the judicial panel on multi-
district litigation can transfer a parallel litigation to a single court for coor-
dination or consolidation. 27 Additionally, a federal court may grant a
preliminary injunction against suits in other federal courts. 28
B. Federal-State Parallel Litigation
Within the federal court system, the principal concerns regarding
parallel litigation are efficiency, economy, and justice.29 As outlined in
Colorado River, the underlying concerns for federal-state parallel litigation
need not state the claim if (I) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another
pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or other process by
which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is
not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13."
24 Southern Constr. Co. v. Pickard, 371 U.S. 57,60 (1962).
25 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (West 1994) provides that: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses*
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought." Although this provision was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, it was intended to be a revision rather than a codification of the common law. See, e.g.,
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981).
26 MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 172-73.
27 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407(a) (1995) provides that: "When civil actions involving one or more common
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings
will be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and will promote the just and efficient conduct of
such actions. Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously
terminated: Provided, however, that the panel may separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or
third-party claim and remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded." It
should be noted that a transfer under § 1404(a) or § 1407 will be workable only when both proceedings are
pending in the federal courts. When parallel litigations are pending in a federal court and a state court, or
in a federal court and a foreign court, the federal court cannot transfer the proceeding to the state or foreign
court. MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 177, 208.
28 See, e.g., William Gluckin & Co. v. International Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1969);
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Note that "even though the
order would be directed toward the parties in effect it acts to restrain the other court and therefore
represents an interference with the jurisdiction of another tribunal." I IA CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2942, at 58 (2d ed. 1995).
29 MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 148.
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are "wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation." 30 However, when
both federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over a certain
subject matter, and the parallel litigation is pending in the state court,
federalism may require the federal court to abstain from exercising
jurisdiction.3 '
The abstention rule for the federal court is an exception, not the rule,
however, and is appropriate in only three categories: (1) in cases presenting
a "federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a dif-
ferent posture by a state court";32 (2) in cases presenting "difficult questions
of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import"; 33 and
(3) in cases where federal jurisdiction has been invoked to restrain state
criminal proceedings. 34
In contrast to abstention, federal courts can enjoin the state court from
proceeding, albeit with significant statutory limitations.35  The Anti-
Injunction Act provides that "[a] court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly author-
ized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments." 36 The Supreme Court confirmed that
"the Act is an absolute prohibition against any injunction of any state-court
proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of the three specifically
defined exceptions in the Act. The Act's purpose is to forestall the
30 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1975). For more
detailed analysis of the Colorado River decision, see James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to
Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1994); David A. Sonenshein, Abstention: The
Crooked Course of Colorado River, 59 TUL. L. REV. 651 (1985). This rationale is equally applicable to the
international litigation context. In fact, the Ninth Circuit once reversed the district court's grant of a stay
order in deference to the Swiss litigation, finding that "there are no 'exceptional circumstances' justifying
the invocation of the Colorado River abstention doctrine." The Ninth Circuit specifically observed that
"the fact that the parallel proceedings are pending in a foreign jurisdiction rather than in a state court is
immaterial. We reject the notion that a federal court owes greater deference to foreign courts than to our
own state courts." Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir. 1991).
Nevertheless, in dealing with international parallel litigation, some federal courts are reluctant to rely on
the Colorado River abstention doctrine. See, e.g., Lodise E. Teitz, Taking Multiple Bites of the Apple: A
Proposal to Resolve Conflicts of Jurisdiction and Multiple Proceedings, 26 INT'L LAW. 21, 49 (1992).
31 MARCUS& SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 148,208.
32 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 816.
35 MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 15, at 208.
36 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (1995).
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inevitable friction between the state and federal courts that ensues from the
injunction of state judicial proceedings by a federal court."37
C. Federal-Foreign Parallel Litigation
When a parallel litigation is pending in a foreign court, a federal court
will, in principle, allow the foreign parallel litigation to proceed simultane-
ously with the federal litigation, unless and until a judgment on the merit is
reached in one court.38 This premise is consistent with the statutory struc-
ture concerning domestic parallel litigation, in which the parallel
proceedings are not per se prohibited. That is, since there is no statute or
treaty which explicitly restricts international parallel litigation, it is natural
for a federal court to conclude that international parallel litigation is
basically permissible.
However, the magnitude of the undesirable effects of parallel litiga-
tion, such as the duplication of the litigants' costs, the waste of judicial
resources, and the possibility of contradictory judgments, will be greater for
international parallel litigation than for domestic parallel litigation. Accord-
ingly, under certain circumstances, federal courts endeavor to restrict
international parallel litigation by resorting to forum non conveniens,
international comity, lis alibipendens, or antisuit injunction.
1. Forum Non Conveniens
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, even when a case falls
within its jurisdiction, a federal court may dismiss the case if (1) the court
deems itself as a seriously inconvenient forum, and (2) the court is satisfied
that an adequate alternative forum exits.39 In endorsing the doctrine of
forum non conveniens in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,40 the Supreme Court
37 Vendo Co. v. Lektro Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623,630 (1977).
38 When the foreign court reaches a judgment on the merit, international comity becomes relevant.
See infr a part III.C.2.
39 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 n.22 (1981) ("At the outset of any forum non
conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily, this
requirement will be satisfied when the defendant is 'amenable to process' in the other jurisdiction. In rare
circumstances, however, where the remedy offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other
forum may not be an adequate alternative, and the initial requirement maynot be satisfied.").
40 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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established the interest-balancing approach, which gives more weight to
private interests than to public interests.41
In Gilbert, the private interest factors to be considered include: (1)
the relative access to source of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling witnesses; (3) the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing witnesses; (4) the possibility of viewing the premises,
if this would be appropriate to the action; (5) all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive; and (6) the
enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. 42
Factors of public interest to be weighed are: (1) the administrative
difficulties which follow for the courts when litigation is piled up in
congested centers instead of being handled at its origin; (2) the burden of
jury duty, which ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community
which has no relation to the litigation; (3) in cases which touch the affairs of
many persons, the desirability of holding the trial in their view and reach
rather than in remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by
report only; (4) the interest in having localized controversies decided at
home; and (5) the appropriateness of having the trial of a diversity case in
the forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather
than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of
law, and in foreign law itself.43
Gilbert dealt with a choice between two U.S. courts. Today, the issue
is covered by statutory transfer under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a) (1995). In
other words, where more than one federal court is concerned, the forum non
conveniens dismissal will no longer be an issue.44 In the context of inter-
national litigation, however, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is still
operative.45 The Supreme Court dealt with this issue in Piper Aircraft,46
involving an air crash in Scotland.47 A representative of the Scottish
41 Id. at 508 ("If the combination and weight of factors requisite to given results are difficult to
forecast or state, those to be considered are not difficult to name. An interest to be considered, and one
likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant.").
42 Id. at 508.
43 Id at 508-09.
44 See 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3828, at 278-79 (2d
ed. 1986 & Supp. 1995) ("The doctrine of forum non conveniens has only a limited continuing vitality in
federal courts. If the more convenient forum is another federal court, since 1948 the case can be
transferred there under § 1404(a) and there is no need for dismissal.").
45 Id. § 3828, at 279-80 ("It is only when the more convenient forum is a foreign country---or
perhaps, under rare circumstances, in a state court or a territorial court-that a suit brought in a proper
federal venue can be dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens.").
46 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
47 Id at 238.
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victims killed in the accident brought wrongful-death actions in a federal
court against Piper Aircraft, a manufacturer of the crashed airplane.48 Piper
Aircraft moved to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens.49 The
district court relied on the balancing test set forth in Gilbert, and found both
private and public interest factors strongly pointed toward Scotland as the
appropriate forum. 50 The Third Circuit reversed on the ground that (1) the
district court abused its discretion in conducting the Gilbert analysis, and
(2) the dismissal is never appropriate where the law of the alternative forum
is less favorable to the plaintiff.51
The Supreme Court first found that the Third Circuit "erred in hold-
ing that plaintiffs may defeat a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that would be
applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of
the present forum," and held that "[t]he possibility of a change in substan-
tive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial
weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry."52 As for the appellate review
of the Gilbert analysis, the Supreme Court formulated a restrictive set of
criteria. 53 Based on these criteria, the Supreme Court found that the district
court's analysis of the private and public interest factors was reasonable, 54
and, therefore, the Third Circuit has erred in rejecting the district court's
Gilbert analysis. 55 Thus, the Supreme Court confirmed the legitimacy of
the Gilbert interest-balancing approach in the international litigation
context.
However, Piper Aircraft did not involve an international parallel liti-
gation situation and did not address how foreign parallel litigation affects
the forum non conveniens analysis. Following the Piper Aircraft decision,
several federal courts addressed the forum non conveniens issue in interna-
tional parallel litigation.
48 Id. at 235.
49 Id. at 241.
50 Id. at 241-43.
51 Id. at 244.
52 Id. at 247. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit recently held that 'forum non conveniens is not
applicable if American law controls." Rivendell Forest Products v. Canadian Pacific, 2 F.3d 990, 994
(10th Cir. 1993). It might be difficult to reconcile this Rivendell holding with the above cited Piper
Aircraft holding.
53 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 257. ("The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion;
where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of
these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference.").
54 Id at 257-58.
55 Id. at 261.
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In Picaso-Anstalt,56 Pierre Cardin, a French individual, sued Shulton,
a New Jersey corporation in Paris, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that a
certain licensing agreement was validly terminated.57 Three days later,
Shulton, joined by its parent corporation, American Cyanamid, instituted a
reactive suit in a federal court against Cardin and Picaso-Anstalt, a French
foundation related to Cardin, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the
licensing agreement was still in force. 58 Picaso and Cardin filed a motion to
stay or dismiss. 59
The federal court noted that "[i]n determining whether or not to grant
a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, the court must first ascertain
whether there is'an adequate alternative forum in which the suit may be
brought."' 60 In accordance with Gilbert and Piper Aircraft, the court then
balanced. the private and public interest factors. 61 The court concluded that
"[w]hile the private interest factors are roughly balanced, the public interest
factors are not, with the latter weighing heavily in favor of retention of
jurisdiction in this forum." 62 As a result, the court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss.
In Picaso-Anstalt, the federal litigation was filed as a reactive suit
against the French litigation. Nevertheless, while discussing forum non
conveniens, especially while balancing the private and public interest
factors, the court failed to consider whether Shulton had a legitimate interest
in instituting the reactive suit.63
In Herbstein,64 Herbstein, a U.S. resident originally from Argentina,
sued Bruetman, also a U.S. resident originally from Argentina, in an
Argentinean court, seeking inter alia his removal as director of a certain
venture company in Argentina. 65  Bruetman then sued Herbstein in
Argentina, alleging accounting irregularities in the said venture company.6 6
56 American Cyanamid Co. v. Picaso-Anstalt, 741 F. Supp. 1150 (D.N.J. 1990).
57 Id. at 1154.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 As the court eventually denied the motion to dismiss on another ground, it was not necessary to
ascertain the adequacy of the French court. The court, however, did not ascertain whether the French court
is an adequate alternative forum. Instead, the court just assumed that the French court is an adequate
alternative forum. Picaso-Anstalt, 741 F. Supp. at 1156-58.
61 Id
62 Id. at 1158.
63 As a matter of fact, the court's forum non conveniens analysis never referred to the presence of the
French parallel litigation. Id.
c Herbstein v. Bruetman, 743 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
65 Id. at 186.
66 ld.
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In turn, Herbstein sued Bruetman and other defendants in a federal court,
alleging that they misrepresented and defrauded him in funding the said
venture company. 67 The defendants moved to dismiss the federal litigation
on the grounds of comity or forum non conveniens, or to stay the federal
litigation pending the litigation in Argentina.68
As for forum non conveniens, citing Piper Aircraft and Gilbert, the
court first noted that "[t]he plaintiff's choice of forum should only be
disturbed if the balance of factors strongly favors the defendants."69 The
court then considered the private and public interest factors set out in
Gilbert, and concluded that both the private and public interest factors
weighed in favor of the plaintiff.70 The court denied the defendants' motion
to dismiss, without addressing whether the Argentine court would be an
adequate alternative forum. Moreover, as in Picaso-Anstalt, in analyzing
forum non conveniens, the court did not consider whether Herbstein had a
legitimate interest in filing the parallel litigation in the federal court.
In Jayaraman,71 the court paid some attention to the special issues
involved in foreign parallel litigation. In this case, Cocoa Merchants
Limited ("CML"), a British corporation, sued Jayaraman, a Malaysian busi-
ness person, in Malaysia, seeking payment of his promissory note.72
Jayaraman then sued Philipp Brothers, Inc. ("Phibro"), CML's parent and a
New York corporation, and Salomon, Phibro's parent and a Delaware
corporation, alleging violations of RICO, the Commodity Exchange Act,
breaches of fiduciary duties, breaches of contractual obligations, negli-
gence, and infliction of emotional and physical harm. 73 As noted by the
court, several of Jayaraman's claims in the federal suit were "strikingly
similar to his defenses and counterclaims in the Malaysian action."74 The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens.75
At the outset, the court noted that it "must first decide whether an
adequate alternative forum exists," and found that "Malaysia is an available
67 Id. at 186-87.
68 Id. at 185.
69 Id at 188.
70 Id at 189-90.
71 K.R. Jayaraman v. Salomon Inc., No. 87 Civ. 2781 (MJL), 1991 WL 61071, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4205 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1991).
72 1991 WL61071 at *3.73 Id. at * I-*3.
74 Id.
75 Id. at * I.
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and adequate alternative forum for this action."76 Next, relying on Piper
Aircraft and Gilbert, the court balanced the relevant interests and found that
"both the private and public interest factors articulated in Gulf Oil [v.
Gilbert] weigh in favor of dismissal of this action." 77 The defendants'
motion was granted.
As for forum non conveniens, the court considered the last element of
Gilbert's private-interest factors: "all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." 78 Since the Malaysian
parallel litigation was factually related to the federal litigation and some
duplication was inevitable, the court held that "the similarities in the claims
and the identity of certain important evidence provides an indication that the
Malaysian Court is a convenient forum to try these issues."79 This court,
too, did not consider whether Jayaraman had a legitimate interest in filing
the reactive suit with the federal court.
2. International Comity
In dealing with various aspects of international litigation, the
Supreme Court has also relied on the theory of international comity, 80 such
as recognition of foreign judgments, 81 enforcement of forum selection or
arbitration clauses, 82 and the act of state doctrine. 83 In Hilton, the Court
defined the concept of "comity" as follows:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judi-
cial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
76 Id at *4.
77 Id. at *4-*8.
78 Id. at *7.
79 Id.
80 GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
22-26(1992).
81 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
82 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1(1972).
83 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.84
Before the Supreme Court dealt with the issues of comity and international
parallel litigation, however, the Eleventh Circuit considered the subject in
Turner.85 In that case, Degeto and other German broadcasters filed a
declaratory judgment action against Turner in Germany, seeking judicial
support for their interpretation of a certain broadcast license agreement. 86 A
week later in a state court, Turner filed an instant breach of contract action,
which was then removed to a federal court based on diversity.8 7 In the
federal action, Turner sought an injunction to enjoin the use of certain tech-
nology to broadcast licensed works.88 Degeto countered with a motion to
dismiss, or, alternatively, a stay in deference to the parallel proceedings in
Germany.89 However, the district court granted Turner's motion for a
preliminary injunction and denied Degeto's motion to dismiss or stay.90
Degeto appealed.
The German court then rendered a decision on the merits.91 In view
of this development, and citing Hilton,92 the court noted:
While courts regularly permit parallel proceedings in an
American court and a foreign court ... once a judgment on the
merits is reached in one of the cases, as in the German forum in
this case, failure to defer to the judgment would have serious
implications for the concerns of international comity. For
example, the prospect of "dueling courts," conflicting judg-
ments, and attempts to enforce conflicting judgments raise
major concerns of international comity. 93
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit granted the stay based on interna-
tional comity, fairness, and efficiency considerations. 94
84 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64.
85 Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512 (11 th Cir. 1994).
86 Id at 1516.
87 Id at 1517.
88 Id. at 1514.
89 Id. at 1517.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1518.
92 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
93 Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1521 (11 th Cir. 1994).
94 Id. at 1523.
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Note that, unlike forum non conveniens, abstention for international
comity is limited to cases in which the foreign court has already rendered its
judgment.95 In addition, "comity requires that the parties and issues in both
litigations are the same or sufficiently similar, such that the doctrine of res
judicata can be asserted. '96
3. Lis Alibi Pendens
Lis alibi pendens, meaning "a suit pending elsewhere," 97 is a
common law rule.98 As such, there is no statutory provision to empower the
federal courts to stay their proceedings. 99 The Supreme Court has held that
"the power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every
court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of
time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants."100 The doctrine
allows a federal court to stay its proceeding in favor of a foreign parallel
litigation, so that it can "prevent needlessly duplicative discovery and
proceedings, thus conserving judicial resources and sparing the parties the
expense of pursuing and defending two like actions." 101
When a federal litigation is stayed, it is anticipated that a foreign
parallel litigation shall proceed to a final judgment, which shall be recog-
nized in the United States. Otherwise, the federal litigation will be
revived. 102 Thus, stays will not be granted in international litigation when
(1) the foreign litigation will not provide a complete resolution of the issues
95 See. e.g., Herbstein v. Bruetman, 743 F. Supp. 184, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("If a judgment is
reached first in the foreign court, it can be pled as res judicata in the domestic court. Without a finaljudgment from another court, surrender ofjurisdiction is justified only under exceptional circumstances.")
96 Herbstein, 743 F. Supp. at 188. In Boushel v. Toro Co., a federal district court stayed the federal
litigation after having found that the operative facts supporting the claims in the federal litigation were
exactly the same as those in Canadian litigation. The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal against the
district court's stay order on the ground that the decision of the district court staying the federal litigation is
not a final order subject to appellate review. Boushel v. Toro Co., 985 F.2d 406, 410 (8th Cir. 1993).
97 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 931 (6th ed. 1990).
98 BORN & WESTIN, supra note 80, at 320.
99 Id.
100 Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
101 Heuft Systemtechnik, GmbH v. Videojet Systems Int'l, Inc., No. 93-C0935, 1993 WL 147506,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 1993). See also 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1360, at 439 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1995) (Federal courts consider stay
motions in an effort to maximize the effective utilization of judicial resources and to minimize the
possibility of conflicts between different courts).
102 BORN & WESTIN, supra note 80, at 320.
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between the parties, or (2) the foreign litigation is still in its preliminary
stage. 103
In granting a stay, the court considers five factors: (1) similarity of
parties and issues, (2) promotion of judicial efficiency and economy, (3)
adequacy of relief available in the alternative forum, (4) possible prejudice
to any party, and (5) the order in which the actions were filed. 10 4 These
factors can overlap with those to be considered in a forum non conveniens
dismissal. For instance, in Caspian, which involvedforum non conveniens,
the court examined the same factors as those involved "in determining
whether to grant a stay or a dismissal because of litigation in an overseas
forum."' 105 Thus, it is not surprising that a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens is often joined by an alternative motion to stay.106
In theory, lis alibi pendens and forum non conveniens should result in
entirely different consequences with regard to the disposition of a federal
litigation. In a forum non conveniens dismissal, the federal litigation is
officially terminated, while in a lis alibi pendens stay, the federal litigation
is temporarily stopped and is supposed to be revived in the future. In prac-
tice, however, at least in international parallel litigation, the lis alibi
pendens stay and the forum non conveniens dismissal produce nearly identi-
cal results.
First, a forum non conveniens dismissal may work as the equivalent
of a stay order when a federal court grants a motion to conditionally
dismiss. 10 7 In Sussman,I0 8 for instance, the court granted a conditional
dismissal of the federal proceeding, directing that "an agreement signifying
the agreement of the defendant and the Government of Israel to these
103 Herbstein v. Bruetman, 743 F. Supp. 184, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Modem Computer
Corp. v. Ma, 862 F. Supp. 938, 949 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Because the proceedings in Taiwan will not resolve
all of the issues with which this Court has been presented, the defendant's motion to stay is denied.")(citing Herbstein).( 04 Caspian Invs., Ltd. v. Vicom Holdings, Ltd., 770 F. Supp. 880, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
105 id. at 884.
106 Teitz, supra note 30, at 31. Because of the similar underlying considerations, courts tend to
handle a motion to stay as superfluous to the motion to dismiss. In Picaso-Anstalt, for example, the court
first considered a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, and then addressed a motion
to stay using the framework developed for the resolution of the motion to dismiss under forum non
conveniens. American Cyanamid Co. v. Picaso-Anstalt, 741 F. Supp. 1150, 1154 (D.N.J. 1990). In
Caspian, the court also addressed the stay and the dismissal within the same framework, although it did not
specifically identify the forum non conveniens issue. Caspian, 770 F. Supp. at 884-85.
107 Many courts have imposed various conditions as requirements for granting a dismissal. See
generally BoRN & WESTIN, supra note 80, at 316.
108 Sussman v. Bank of Israel, 801 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), affd, 990 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1993).
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conditions be filed with this Court within sixty (60) days of this Opinion.
Upon the filing of that agreement, the conditional order of dismissal will be
made absolute."109 Similarly, in Borden,"10 while dismissing the federal
litigation on the grounds of forum non conveniens in deference to a
Japanese court, the Second Circuit allowed the plaintiff to reapply for a
preliminary injunction in a federal district court, if the Japanese court did
not rule on the plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction within
sixty days after the submission. Il
Second, if a federal court stays its proceeding in deference to a
foreign litigation, it is likely that the foreign litigation would eventually
reach a final judgment on the merits, which can be pled as resjudicata. The
federal litigation would then be dismissed for international comity, even
though it may have been revived from the stay. Here, the stay order has the
same consequence as a dismissal.
4. Antisuit injunction
a. Liberal view
Although there is no direct statutory authorization, U.S. courts have
never doubted their authority to enjoin parties from proceeding before
foreign courts.1 12 To issue an antisuit injunction, a court must first ascertain
that (1) the parties to both suits are the same and (2) resolution of the case
before the enjoining court would be dispositive of the enjoined action.1 13
109 Sussman, 801 F. Supp. at 1079. In the subsequent history, the undertakings which the court had
ordered as a condition for dismissal were in fact filed, and as a result the dismissal became absolute. Letter
from Angela G. Garcia, Attorney-at-law, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, to the author (Mar. 2,
1995) n file with author).
110 Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Products Co., 919 F.2d 822 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
953 (1991).
I l d. at829.
112 Teresa D. Baer, Injunctions Against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad: Towards a
Transnational Approach, 37 STAN. L. REv. 155, 155 (1984). A federal court may also issue an anti-
antisuit injunction, which enjoins a party from applying for an antisuit injunction in a foreign litigation.
See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 731 F.2d
909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In addition, when a foreign court has already issued an antisuit injunction against the
federal proceeding, the federal court may issue a counter injunction, which restrains a party before the
court from enforcing a foreign antisuit injunction. There have been no reported cases in which a federal
court actually issued a counter-injunction. See, e.g., James v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 14 I11. 2d 356, 152
N.E.2d 858 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
113 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987).
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In federal practice, injunctions against state proceedings are signifi-
cantly restricted by statute.11 4 In contrast, there are no statutory restrictions
on injunctions against foreign proceedings, and until recently the federal
courts granted antisuit injunctions against foreign proceedings in a
relatively free manner. For instance, in Seattle Totems,' 15 the owners of a
Seattle hockey team brought a federal antitrust action against the owners of
a Vancouver team and other defendants. The owners of the Vancouver team
then filed a reactive suit in Canada against the owners of the Seattle team.1 16
The central issue in both suits was the validity of a certain agreement. 117
Therefore, the parties and the issues in both litigations were the same and
the resolution of one litigation would be dispositive of another.
Under these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit relied upon Unterweser
Reederei. 1 8  In Unterweser Reederi, the Fifth Circuit noted that a foreign
litigation may be enjoined when it will (1) frustrate the policy of the forum
issuing the injunction, (2) be vexatious or oppressive, (3) threaten the issu-
ing court's in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, or (4) prejudice other
equitable considerations.119
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that adjudicating the same cen-
tral issue in two separate actions is likely to result in unnecessary delay, and
substantial inconvenience and expense to the parties and witnesses. More-
over, separate adjudications could result in inconsistent rulings or even a
race to judgment.120 Noting that the district court had considered the rele-
vant factors, including "the convenience to the parties and witnesses, the
interest of the courts in promoting the efficient administration of justice,
and the potential prejudice to one party or the other," and concluding that
the equitable balance weighs heavily in favor of the plaintiff, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of an antisuit injunction.121
114 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (1995).
'15 Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied sub nom. Northwest Sports Enters., Ltd. v. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc., 457 U.S. 1105
(1982?16 Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 852.
117 fd. at 853-54.
118 In re Unterweser Reederei GmbH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd on rehearing en banc,
446 F.2d 907 (1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I
(1972?'19 Unterweser Reederei, 428 F.2d at 890.
120 Seattle Totems, 652 F.2d at 856.
121 Id
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Another example of the liberal view can be found in Cargill. 122 In
this federal court case, Cargill, a Minnesota insured, sued Hartford Accident
and Indemnity Company ("Hartford") and Federal Insurance Company
("Federal"), seeking recovery under two separate policies of insurance.1 23
On the same day, Federal filed a declaratory judgment action against Cargill
in England. 124 After denying the Federal's motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens, the District Court for the District of Minnesota granted
Cargill's motion for an antisuit injunction. The court reasoned that:
For the reasons stated in the discussion of forum non
conveniens, the convenience of the parties, as well as the inter-
est of judicial economy, weigh in favor of the issuance of the
injunction. It would be vexatious to Cargill and a waste of
judicial resources to require adjudication of Federal's liability
in two separate forums. Separate adjudication could further
prejudice Cargill by the risk of inconsistent results and a
possible race to judgment.125
It is notable that, in both Seattle Totems and Cargill, the courts have
regarded an antisuit injunction as the opposite of the forum non conveniens
dismissal by employing an analytical approach, which can be described as
the mirror image of theforum non conveniens doctrine.126
122 Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 531 F. Supp. 7 10 (D. Minn. 1982).
123 Id. at 712.
124 Id. at 713.
125 Id. at 715.
126 Under this approach, a denial of aforum non conveniens dismissal would automatically result in
the granting of an antisuit injunction. This indicates that these courts believe that a litigation should take
place only in the most convenient court, and a parallel litigation must also be tried in the most convenient
court. This type of analysis pays little attention to international comity concerns. Not only does such an
approach present a danger of interfering with foreign judicial sovereignty, but it is also inconsistent with
the traditional federal practice, which basically allows for parallel proceedings. In Gau Shan, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court's grant of an antisuit injunction, concluding that "the district court's
reasoning, in deciding that this case did not violate the dictates of international comity, is more properly the
analysis to be used when considering a motion for dismissal of a case on forum non conveniens grounds
rather than a motion for a foreign antisuit injunction." Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349,
1355 (6th Cir. 1992).
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b. Restrictive view
In recent years, federal courts have tended to restrict the granting of
antisuit injunctions. The D.C. Circuit in Laker 27 exemplified this restric-
tive view toward the granting of antisuit injunctions. In that case, Laker, a
British air carrier, filed a federal antitrust action against a number of major
U.S., British and other European airlines and companies, alleging predatory
pricing and other unlawful interferences. 128
In response, British Airways and some of the other European airlines
filed a reactive suit in England, seeking a mirror-image declaratory judg-
ment and an injunction prohibiting Laker from proceeding in the federal
antitrust action. 129 The High Court of Justice issued an interlocutory
injunction, preventing Laker from taking any action in the federal courts or
elsewhere to interfere with the British proceedings. 130 Laker then sought a
temporary restraining order from a federal district court to prevent the U.S.
defendants from instituting similar preemptive proceedings in England.
This was granted immediately.131
Laker next filed a similar federal antitrust action against KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines and Sabena.132 The district court granted a preliminary
injunction against KLM and Sabena, preventing them from taking any
action before a foreign court or governmental authority that would have
impaired the district court's jurisdiction over the matters alleged in the
complaint. 133 KLM and Sabena appealed.
In affirming the lower court's ruling, the D.C. Circuit confined the
purpose of an antisuit injunction to "conserv[ing] the court's ability to reach
judgment." Thus, a court would grant an injunction only if a foreign court
attempts to "interfere with an in personam action before the domestic court"
or to "carve out exclusive jurisdiction over concurrent jurisdiction."' 134
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit maintained that "parallel proceedings on the
same in personam claim should ordinarily be allowed to proceed
127 Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
128 Id at917.
129 Jd at918.
130 Id. This antisuit injunction, however, was ultimately vacated by the House of Lords. See
British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, Ltd., [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413, 1985 App. Cas. 58.
131 Laker, 731 F.2d at 918.
132 Id.
133 Id. at918-19.
134 Id. at 929-30.
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simultaneously, at least until a judgment is reached in one court, which can
then be pled as resjudicata in the other."135
The D.C. Circuit clearly denied the liberal approach employed in
Seattle Totems and Cargill by holding that "the possibility of an
'embarrassing race to judgment' or potentially inconsistent adjudications
does not outweigh the. respect and deference owed to independent foreign
proceedings."136
Laker involved an antitrust suit. The U.S. government has shown
much policy concern over abtitrust suits, and the Laker court's affirmation
of the antisuit injunction parallels this policy. In ordinary civil cases, how-
ever, the Laker standard will significantly restrict antisuit injunctions. For
example, five years after Laker, the D.C. Circuit reversed an antisuit
injunction order. Sea Containers137 was a case in which the target of a
tender offer sued the tender offeror in a federal court, and the tender offeror
sued the target in a Bermuda court. In reversing the district court's issuance
of the antisuit injunction against Bermuda litigation, the D.C. Circuit first
observed that "even if the Bermuda court reached a decision first, it would
not deprive the district court of its jurisdiction over the federal securities
issues." 138 It then concluded that "[i]n short, because the Bermuda action
poses no threat to the jurisdiction of the district court, it is no basis for the
anti-suit injunction here."139
Several other circuits have followed the D.C. Circuit. In China
Trade,14 0 for instance, the Second Circuit approved of the D.C. Circuit's
restrictive view. In this admiralty action arising out of the wreck of a trans-
port ship and the destruction of soybean cargo, the district court issued a
permanent injunction enjoining defendant shipowner from bringing a paral-
lel action in Korea. The court reasoned that the Korean litigation would (1)
be vexatious to the plaintiffs, and (2) result in added expense and a race to
judgment. 141
Citing the Laker decision and after giving due regard to international
comity, the Second Circuit focused on two primary issues: (1) whether the
foreign action threatened the jurisdiction of the enjoining forum, and (2)
whether strong public policies of the enjoining forum were threatened by
135 Id. at 926-27.
136 Id. at928-29.
137 Sea Containers Ltd. v. Stena AB, 890 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
138 Id. at 1214.
139 Id.
140 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
141 Id. at 34.
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the foreign action. 142 The Second Circuit did not find any threat to the
district court's jurisdiction. Moreover, the party seeking to litigate in the
foreign tribunal was not attempting to evade any important policy of this
forum. 143 Accordingly, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's
grant of an antisuit injunction, holding that equity relied upon in granting
the antisuit injunction was not sufficient to overcome the degree of restraint
and caution required by international comity.4
The Sixth Circuit also followed the restrictive trend set by the D.C.
Circuit. Gau Shan, a Hong Kong borrower, sued Bankers Trust, an
American lender, alleging fraud, deceit, and negligence in connection with a
note, and sought an injunction to restrain the lender from initiating a legal
action in Hong Kong.145 The district court granted the injunction, and
Bankers Trust appealed. For the Sixth Circuit, the issue was whether the
district court offended the principles of international comity in issuing a
preliminary injunction. 146 Moreover, the Sixth Circuit dictated that because
of international comity, courts should issue foreign antisuit injunctions in
the most extreme cases where (1) this court's jurisdiction is threatened by
the foreign action, or (2) this court's important public policies are being
evaded by the foreign action. 147 The Sixth Circuit found that neither of
these contingencies had been met. 148 Thus, the court held that international
comity precludes the issuance of an antisuit injunction and that the district
court abused its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction order. 149
c. Limitation of antisuit injunctions abroad
In the absence of any statutory sanctions against violation of an anti-
suit injunction, there is no sure way to enforce an antisuit injunction order
in foreign countries. 150 Note that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
142 Id. at 36.
143 Id. at 37.
144 Id.
145 Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992).
146 Id. at 1351.
147 Id. at 1354-55.
148 Id. at 1358.
149 Id.
150 One commentator asserts that a "domestic court should never recognize or enforce a foreign
antisuit injunction aimed at a party before the court." Note, Antisuit Injunctions and International Comity,
71 VA. L. REV. 1039, 1066 (1985) (emphasis added). Similarly, one Japanese scholar explicitly argues
that, under no circumstances, would a Japanese court recognize or enforce a U.S. antisuit injunction order
in Japan, as antisuit injunctions by their nature totally differ from ordinary civil judgments. KAZuNORi
ISHIGURO, KOKUSAI MASATSU TO HO [LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FRICTION] 53 (1994).
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provide for sanctions against a failure to obey a discovery order.,5' Under
the federal rules, the sanctions available to a court include (1) an order
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party,152 and (2) an
order treating the failure to obey as a contempt of court. 5 3 However, no
such sanction is available to a federal court if a party fails to obey an anti-
suit injunction order. 154
Besides, even if sanctions similar to those provided for violating a
discovery were available, they would work effectively only against a U.S.
resident or a foreign entity with substantial assets in the United States.155
This is because enforcing U.S. court sanctions would be difficult in a
foreign jurisdiction. 5 6  For instance, Japanese courts are reluctant to
recognize and enforce foreign default judgments in Japan. 157 Similarly,
where the court orders payment of a fine for civil contempt, such order will
not be recognizable in Japan. 158 As a consequence, it would be a feasible
option for the Japanese litigants to proceed with the Japanese parallel
151 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2) provides that: "Ifa party... fails to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery,... the court in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are
just."
152 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(bX2)(C).
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D).
154 One commentator implied that civil and criminal sanctions are available for disobeying a
permanent injunction which enjoins the clawback of multiple damages. Note, Power to Reverse Foreign
Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under International Law, 81 COLUM.. L. REV. 1097, 1131
(19811?55 To issue an antisuit injunction the federal court must have personal jurisdiction over the
enjoined party. Having jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that the enjoined party has assets in the
United States, as the jurisdiction of the federal court can be inferred by another factor. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1971 & Supp. 1995).
156 Professor Ishiguro firmly denies recognizability and enforceability in Japan of such sanctions.
Interview with Kazunori Ishiguro, Professor of Law, University of Tokyo, in Tokyo, Japan (Jan. 23, 1995).
157 Article 200, Item 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Japan requires that the foreign judgment
to be recognized is not contrary to the public order or good morals in Japan. MINJI SOSHCHO [CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE], Law No. 29 of 1890. The Supreme Court held that this provision requires that both the
contents and the procedure of the foreign judgment are not contrary to the public order or good morals in
Japan. Judgment of June 7, 1983 (Tei v. Burroughs Corp.), Saik6sai [Supreme Court], 37 Minshfi 611,
614, translated in 27 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L LAW 119 (1984). Thus, it is likely that the U.S. default
judgment, which is entered as a sanction, would be held unrecognizable in Japan, on the grounds that its
procedure is contrary to the public policy in Japan.
158 Japanese courts will recognize civil judgments only. In Mansei KdgyJ, the Tokyo High Court
refused to recognize the California State Superior Court's judgment which awarded punitive damages,
holding that (i) under Japanese legal order, the punitive damages judgment shall be classified as a criminal
judgment rather than a civil judgment and would not be considered a foreign judgment to be recognized
under the Code of Civil Procedures, and (ii) to enforce the punitive damages judgment would violate the
public order in Japan. Judgment of June 28, 1993 (Northcon v. Mansei K6gy6 K.K.), Tokyo High Ct.,
1471 HANREI RIHO 89, 91. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (1986) ("Courts
in the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines,
or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.").
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litigation, notwithstanding the federal court's antisuit injunction, since the
violation of the antisuit injunction will not result in effective sanctions for
them.
IV. RULES AND PRACTICES IN JAPAN
A. Statutory Provision, Case Law, and Scholarly Opinions159
1. The Statutory Prohibition Against Parallel Litigation
In Japan, 160 parallel litigation is statutorily prohibited by the Code of
Civil Procedure. 16 1 In particular, article 231 provides: "Neither party may
file another suit concerning the same case pending in a different court." 162
The rationale behind this provision is that parallel litigation (1) will unjustly
waste the time, labor, and expenses of both the parties and the court, (2)
may result in contradicting and conflicting judgments, (3) will not facilitate
the protection of rights nor the resolution of disputes, and (4) will harm the
authority of the court. 163 As a result, if a party to a Japanese litigation files
another suit concerning the same subject matter with a different Japanese
court, the latter litigation shall be dismissed. 164
2. Courts 'Interpretation of the Statute Against Parallel Litigation
a. Inapplicability of article 231 to foreign parallel litigation
On its face, it is unclear whether article 231 of the Japanese Code of
Civil Procedures applies in the international context. However, courts have
159 Citations in this article from Japanese statutes, court decisions and other official documents are
the author's English translation from Japanese originals.
160 For a brief outline of the Japanese judicial system and civil procedure, see, e.g., TAKAAKI
HATTORI & DAN F. HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (1985).
161 MINJI SOSHOHO [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Law No. 29 of 1890.
162 This provision originates from a similar provision in Section 263 of the German Code of Civil
Procedure, which also prohibits parallel litigation. See Obuchi, supra note 5, at 6 ("With respect to the
domestic lis pendens rule, the German Civil Procedure Code (Zivilprozeflordnung) . . . Sec. 261
(previously Sec. 263 . . .) provides that lis pendens has the effect that the claim (Streitsache) cannot be
raisedby a party in another place during the continuation of the lispendens.").
163 KORECHIKA KIKUI & TOSHIO MURAMATSU, 2 MINJI SOSHOHO [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 149
(Revised ed. 1989).
164 HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 160, § 4.06[5] ("The pendency of an action in a Japanese
court, whether or not properly brought, bars the assertion of another claim in another Japanese court on the
same subject matter between the same parties.").
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interpreted the word "court" in article 231 to denote Japanese courts only
and to exclude foreign courts. Under this interpretation, article 231 does not
bar international parallel litigation. For example, in Chfika Kokusai
Shimbunsha,165 the Republic of China ("ROC") first sued Lin Hei-shuo, as a
surety, in Taiwan, seeking repayment of a certain loan. 166 The ROC then
filed a repetitive suit in Japan against both Lin and Chfika Kokusai
Shimbunsha, the principal debtor. 167  Chfika Kokusai Shimbunsha
contended that the Japanese court should dismiss the litigation, since it vio-
lates the prohibition of parallel litigation. 16 8 However, the Tokyo District
Court allowed the repetitive suit "because the word 'court' in article 231 of
the Code of Civil Procedures, which prohibits so-called parallel litigation,
shall be interpreted to denote a Japanese court and not to include the foreign
courts." 
169
Until recently, Japanese courts have consistently maintained their
interpretation of article 231 as being inapplicable to foreign parallel litiga-
tion. For example, in Kansai Tekk6sho, a U.S. citizen first filed a product
liability suit in King County, Washington, naming both Marubeni-lida and
Kansai Tekk6sho as joint defendants. Marubeni-lida, a California corpora-
tion, then filed a third-party action in the same court against Kansai
Tekk6sho, a Japanese corporation, seeking an indemnification of the dam-
ages in the event it lost the product liability suit. 170 In response, Kansai
Tekk6sho filed a reactive suit with a Japanese court, seeking a mirror-image
declaratory judgment.171 Following the court's interpretation in Chiika
Kokusai Shimbunsha, the Osaka District Court also held that "the word
'court' in article 231 . ..denotes Japanese courts and does not include
foreign courts."1 72
Moreover, as late as June 1989, the Tokyo District Court held in
165 Judgment of Dec. 23, 1955 (Republic of China v. K.K. Chfika Kokusai Shimbunsha), Tokyo
District Ct., 6 Kaminshfi 2679, summary English translation in 2 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L LAW 138 (1958);
aff'd, Judgment of July 18, 1957 (K.K. Chfika Kokusai Shimbunsha v. Republic of China), Tokyo High
Ct., 8 KaminshOi (vol. 7) 1292.
166 6 KaminshOi at 2681.
167 Id. at 2680.
168 Id. at 2681.
169 Id. at 2683.
170 See Deutsch v. West Coast Machinery Co., 497 P.2d 1311, 80 Wash. 2d 707 (1972), cert.
deniedsub nom. Kansai Iron Works, Ltd. v. Marubeni-lida, Inc., 409 U.S. 1009 (1972).
171 Interlocutory Judgment of Oct. 9, 1973 (K.K. Kansai Tekk6sho v. Marubeni-lida (America),
Inc.), Osaka District Ct., 728 HANREI JIHO 76.
172 Id. at 79.
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Shinagawa Hakurenga that:
although the defendant asserts that this suit should be
dismissed because it is the later suit in international parallel
litigation, this allegation cannot be sustained because the word
"court" in article 231 of the Code of Civil Procedures does not
include foreign courts and there is no practice or logical reason
which generally prohibits international parallel litigation. 173
Recently, however, courts have attempted to restrict international parallel
litigation through different frameworks. In Gould,174 for example, a
Delaware corporation sued two Japanese corporations and two French
defendants in a U.S. federal district court, alleging unfair competition, theft
of trade secrets, unjust enrichment, and civil RICO violations. 175 Instead of
appearing before the federal court, one of the Japanese corporations filed a
reactive suit in a Japanese court, seeking a mirror-image declaratory
judgment.
In ruling on Gould's motion to dismiss on the ground of international
parallel litigation, the Japanese court held that:
(i) since "the court" in article 231 of the Code of Civil
Procedures means "Japanese courts" and does not include foreign
courts, this litigation shall not fall within the parallel litigation
barred by article 231;
(ii) in today's world of independent sovereign countries, where
no unified judicial system nor generally accepted principle
concerning distribution of international jurisdiction exists, it is
not adequate to always defer to the preceding foreign litigation;
173 Interlocutory Judgment of June 19, 1989 (Shinagawa Hakurenga v. Houston Technical
Ceramics, Inc.), Tokyo District Ct., 703 HANPEi TAIMUZU 246, 248.
174 Interlocutory Judgment of May 30, 1989 (Miyakoshi Kik6 K.K. v. Gould, Inc.), Tokyo District
Ct., 1348 HANREI JIHO 91,703 HANREi TMMuzu 240.
175 See Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., C85-3199, 1990 WL 103155 (N.D. Ohio
June 29, 1990) (granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as to defendant Mitsui
Mining); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 947 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991) (denying two French
defendants' motion to dismiss by virtue of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
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(iii) nor is it adequate to always neglect the international parallel
litigation situation in the present society in which business trans-
actions are conducted worldwide; and
(iv) with due regard to the spirit of article 200 of the Code of
Civil Procedures, which allows recognition and enforcement of
the foreign judgment, when (a) it can be predicted with reason-
able certainty that the preceding foreign litigation will lead to a
final and irrevocable judgment, and (b) such judgment will be
recognized in Japan, it may be permissible to infer the prohibi-
tion of parallel litigation and regulate the later litigation in the
international parallel litigation situation to avoid conflicting
judgments, and to ensure equity among parties, fair and speedy
litigation, and judicial economy.1 76
The court then noted that, at this stage of the case, it was not possible to
predict with reasonable certainty (1) whether the U.S. federal litigation
would reach a final judgment on the merits, and whether such final judg-
ment would become irrevocable, and (2) whether the U.S. judgment would
satisfy the requirement specified in article 200 for recognition in Japan.177
For these reasons, the court denied the motion to dismiss.
What is significant about the Gould decision is that it addressed the
international parallel litigation issue separately from the issue of interna-
tional jurisdiction. Its logic is consistent with the so-called "recognizability
doctrine."178 However, this has not been the mainstream approach in recent
Japanese case law. The majority of the recent cases have addressed the
issue of international parallel litigation as a part of the international juris-
diction issue.
176 Miyakoshi Kik6 K.K. v. Gould, Inc., 1348 HANREI JIH at 94-95.
177 Id. at 95. Following this interlocutory judgment, the Tokyo District Court proceeded with the
trial of the case, and two years later, reached a judgment on the merits, in which Miyakoshi Kik6 prevailed.
Judgment of Sept. 24, 1991 (Miyakoshi Kik6 K.K. v. Gould, Inc.), Tokyo District Ct., 1429 HANREI JIHO
80, 769 HANREI TAIMUzU 280. Gould once appealed to the Tokyo High Court, but later withdrew the
appeal, making the district court's judgment on the merits irrevocable.
178 See infra part IV.A.3.
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b. Dismissal for lack of internationaljurisdiction
In the absence of a specific statutory provision on the adjudicative
jurisdiction of Japanese courts in international cases, 179 the Supreme Court
set forth the standard for determining the international jurisdiction of
Japanese courts. In Malaysia Airline, 180 a Japanese citizen sued Malaysia
Airline for damages incurred from the crash of a domestic airplane in
Malaysia. The Supreme Court held that:
Because the judicial jurisdiction of one country is a part of its
sovereignty and the scope of the judicial sovereignty shall be
the same as that of sovereignty, the Japanese judicial jurisdic-
tion in principle shall not extend to a foreign corporation,
which has its principal place of business in a foreign country,
unless such corporation voluntarily submits to the Japanese
judicial jurisdiction. As an exception to this principle, how-
ever, it would be adequate to assume the Japanese judicial
jurisdiction, regardless of defendant's nationality or location, in
cases involving land in the Japanese territory or other cases in
which defendant has certain legal -contacts with Japan. Under
the current situation where there is no direct statutory
provision, no relevant international treaty, nor a generally
accepted, clear international principle concerning international
jurisdiction, the courts will have to determine the scope of this
exception in accordance with the Jori [logical reason] by
giving due consideration to facilitating equity among parties,
and fair and speedy litigation. The jori would dictate that the
Japanese court has jurisdiction over a defendant whose place of
living, office of a corporation or other entity, place of perform-
ance, place of property, place of torts, or any other cause of
jurisdiction stipulated in the Code of Civil Procedures, is found
within the territory of Japan.] 8 1
179 HATrORI & HENDERSON, supra note 160, §4.07[1]. See also Masato D6gauchi, Declining
Jurisdiction in Private International Law-Japan, in DECLINING JURISDICTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW 303 (J.J. Fawcett ed., 1995).
180 Judgment of Oct. 16, 1981 (Malaysia Airline System Berhad v. Got6), Saik6sai [Supreme
Court], 35 Minsh6i 1224, translated in 26 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L LAW 122 (1983).
181 Malaysia Airline, 35 Minshii at 1226-27. See also Masato D6gauchi, Concurrent Litigation in
Japan and the United States, 37 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L LAW 72, 76 n. 11 (1994).
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The Supreme Court then confirmed the Japanese court's jurisdiction over
Malaysia Airline, after finding that, although incorporated and having its
principal place of business in Malaysia, one of its offices was located in
Tokyo. 18 2
The Supreme Court's reasoning in the Malaysia Airline decision was
severely criticized, although its disposition of that particular case has been
basically supported.18 3 Most of the criticism focused on the Supreme
Court's holding that the Japanese court has jurisdiction over a defendant
when any cause of jurisdiction stipulated in the Code of Civil Procedures is
found within the territory of Japan. The holding is criticized because it may
result in unreasonable consequences, if it were to be literally applied to
every case.18 4 For example, if the Malaysia Airline decision is literally
applied, a person who has ever lived in Japan, 185 a defendant who has
nominal assets in Japan,18 6 or a defendant jointly sued with a Japanese
defendant, 187 will always be subject to the Japanese courts' jurisdiction.18 8
Responding to these criticisms, lower courts in the post-Malaysia-
Airline era have modified the Supreme Court's standard by allowing an
exception to its literal application.18 9 Muki5da v. Boeing Co., 190 which is
182 Id. at 1227.
183 Some commentators, however, did criticize both the reasoning and the disposition of the case in
the Malaysia Airline decision. These commentators argued that it was improper to confer the Japanese
courts' jurisdiction over the domestic airplane crash in Malaysia by virtue of defendant's Tokyo office
which was not at all involved in the particular occurrence. Takao Sawaki, Saiban Kankatsuken Saik6
[Judicial Jurisdiction Reconsidered], 9 KOKUSAI SHOJI HOMU (vol. 12) 611 (1981); Ryfichi Yamada,
Note, 88 MINSHOHO ZASSHI (vol. 1) 100 (1983).
184 Hideyuki Kobayashi, Kokusai Saiban Kankatsu to Malaysia K&-ki Jiken Hanketsu
[International Judicial Jurisdiction and the Malaysia Airline Decision], 26 HOGAKU SEMINAR (vol. 2) 20,
24 (1982); Morio Takeshita, Note, 637 KINYu SHOJI HANREI 49, 53 (1982); Sawaki, supra note 183, at
613-14.
185 Code of Civil Procedure, art. 2, para. 2 ("In case [a person] has no domicile in Japan or it is
unknown... his general forum shall be determined by his residence.., or... by his last domicile.").
186 Code of Civil Procedure, art. 8 ("Suit concerning a property right against a person not domiciled
in Japan . . may be brought before the court situated in the place where.., any attachable property of the
defendant is located.").
187 Code of Civil Procedure, art. 21 (providing forjurisdiction by virtue ofjoinder of claims).
188 Kobayashi, supra note 184, at 24.
189 Hideyuki Kobayashi, Kokusai Sosh6 Ky6gJ [International Parallel Litigation], 525 NBL 34, 35
(1993); K6ichi Inoue, Kokusaiteki Niu SoshJ a Meguru Saikin no Hanrei no Dk5 [Trend of Recent Case
Law Concerning International Duplicative Litigation], 21 KOKUSAI SHOJI HOMU (vol. 4) 403, 405 (1993).
190 Judgment of June 20, 1986 (Muk6da v. Boeing Co.), Tokyo District Ct., 1196 HANREI JIHO 87,
604 HANREI TAIMUZU 138, summary English translation in 31 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L LAW 216 (1988).
Prior to this Japanese litigation, strict liability and negligence actions had been filed in a U.S. federal court
and the U.S. action had been conditionally dismissed on the ground offorum non conveniens in deference
to a Taiwanese court. See Lui Su Nai-Chao v. Boeing Co., 555 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Ca. 1982), aff d, 708 F.2d
1406 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017 (1983).
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widely known as the Far Eastern Air Transport case, is an illustrative
example. In this case, an airplane operated by Far Eastern Air Transport, a
Taiwanese airline company, crashed in Taipei, killing the passengers and
the crew. Heirs to Japanese victims filed a suit with the Tokyo District
Court. They named Boeing Co., the manufacturer of the airplane, and
United Airlines, Inc., the distributor of the airplane to Far Eastern Air
Transport, as co-defendants. The Tokyo court declined jurisdiction,
although it found that United Airlines had an office in Japan.19 1 The court
held that:
Under the current situation where there is no direct statutory
provision, relevant international treaty, or a generally accepted,
clear international principle confirming international jurisdic-
tion, due concern for equity, and fair and speedy trial should
determine jurisdiction for cases in which a foreign corporation
is a defendant. Moreover, unless extraordinary circumstances
exist, the same logic confers Japanese judicial jurisdiction over
the defendant when any cause of jurisdiction stipulated in the
Code of Civil Procedures is found within the territory of Japan.
The extraordinary circumstances herein stated shall mean such
circumstances under which, in light of particular facts in the
suit pending, the conference of the Japanese court's jurisdiction
will not facilitate equity among parties, and fair and speedy
trial. 192
The court then found that, although important evidence concerning the
cause of the accident would likely be located in Taiwan, the Japanese court
could not obtain such evidence because there were no diplomatic relations
between Japan and Taiwan. Consequently, the court concluded that trying
this case in a Japanese court may violate the principle of facilitating equity,
and fair and speedy litigation.' 93 This approach adopted in Far Eastern Air
191 Accordingly, if the court had literally applied the Malaysia Airline standard, its jurisdiction
would have been conferred due to the location of defendant's office and the joinder of claims. See The
Code of Civil Procedure, art. 4, para. I ("General jurisdiction of a corporation, other associations, or a
foundation shall be conferred by the place of its office.. If it has no office, general jurisdiction shall be
conferred by the place of living of a principal person in charge of its business.") and art. 21 (providing for
jurisdiction by virtue ofjoinder of claims).
192 Muk&da v. Boeing Co., 1196 HANREI JIHO at 92.
193 Id. at 93.
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Transport, which can be characterized as a modified Malaysia Airline
approach, now seems to be in the mainstream of Japanese case law. 194
Several recently reported cases have also addressed foreign parallel
litigation as a factor to be considered by courts in determining whether such
extraordinary circumstances exist.
In Shinagawa Hakurenga,195 Houston Technical, a Texas corpora-
tion, sued Shinagawa Hakurenga, a Japanese corporation, in a federal
district court in Houston. 196 Houston Technical alleged ihat Shinagawa
Hakurenga had willfully or negligently supplied Houston Technical with
defective products. Shinagawa Hakurenga instituted a reactive suit with the
Tokyo District Court, seeking a mirror-image declaratory judgment.
Houston Technical filed a motion to dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction.
. Reciting the Malaysia Airline standard, 197 the Tokyo court held that
jurisdiction is conferred by article 15 of the Code of Civil Procedures, 198
based on its finding that the alleged tortious conduct of manufacturing
defective products had been committed in Japan. The court then determined
that litigating the case in Japan would not interfere with the principle of fair
trial, since (1) witnesses reside in Japan, and (2) although currently located
in the United States, the product at issue can easily be moved to Japan. The
court also held that resolution of the dispute in Japan would not be contrary
to the parties' expectations. Therefore, the Tokyo court denied Houston
Technical's motion to dismiss.199
With regard to the parallel litigation issue, the Shinagawa Hakurenga
court analyzed only whether the Japanese parallel litigation would place
undue negative effects upon Houston Technical. 200 It thus failed to address
194 Toshio Miyatake & Takashi Wakai, Saiban Kankatsu [Jurisdiction to Adjudicate], in 10 SAIBAN
JITSUMU TAIKEI [COMPLETE LITIGATION PRACriCE] 3, 4 (Shin Motoki & Kiyoshi Hosokawa eds.. 1989).195 Interlocutory Judgment of June 19, 1989 (Shinagawa Hakurenga K.K. v. Houston Technical
Ceramics, Inc.), Tokyo District Ct., 703 HANREI.TAIMUZU 246, summary English translation in 33
JAPANESE ANN. INT'L LAW 202 (1990).
196 See Houston Tech. Ceramics, Inc. v. Shinagawa Refractories Co., 745 F. Supp. 406 (S.D. Tex.
1990) (denying both (i) defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and (ii) defendant's
motion to stay pending the outcome of the declaratory judgment action in the Tokyo District Court).
197 Shinagawa Hakurenga K.K. v. Houston Tech. Ceramics, Inc., 703 HANREI TAIMuZU at 247
("There is no statutory provision, no universally accepted international treaty and no practice conceding
international civil jurisdiction Therefore, international jurisdiction over a foreign defendant shall be
determined by logical reason as evidenced by jurisdictional provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure.").
198 The Code of Civil Procedure, art. 15, para. I ("A suit relating to a tort may be brought before
the court of the place where the act was committed.").
199 Shinagawa Hakurenga K.K. v. Houston Tech. Ceramics, Inc., 703 HANREj TAIMUZU at 246.
200 Id. at 248.
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whether Shinagawa Hakurenga had a legitimate motivation in filing the
reactive suit.
In contrast, in what may be the most comprehensive and sophisticated
decision on parallel litigation, the court in Mazaki Bussan201 analyzed both
the negative effects and the legitimacy of motivations for parallel litigation.
In this case, a U.S. citizen filed a product liability suit in California,. naming
both Mazaki Bussan and Nanka Seimen as joint defendants. Nanka Seimen,
a U.S. distributor, then filed another suit in the United States, seeking an
indemnification from Mazaki Bussan, a Japanese manufacturer. Mazaki
Bussan filed a reactive suit with the Tokyo District Court, seeking a mirror-
image declaratory judgment. Nanka Seimen filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.
Using the Malaysia Airline standard, modified by the "extraordinary
circumstances" consideration, the Tokyo court found Nanka Seimen's claim
to be closely related to the U.S. product liability suit. It thus held that the
court's jurisdiction was conferred by article 15 of the Code of Civil
Procedures, 202 since the product liability suit was classified as an action in
tort, alleging the manufacturing of defective products in Japan.203
The court then addressed whether there were extraordinary circum-
stances under which the conference of international jurisdiction based on
article 15 would violate the principle of equity, and fair and speedy trial.
The court found that (1) Nanka Seimen's indemnification claim was condi-
tional upon the outcome of the U.S. product liability suit; (2) because the
U.S. litigation was filed first and a considerable amount of the exchange of
briefs and the collection of evidence had been done, and because almost all
of the evidence was located in the United States, the United States was the
more convenient forum than Japan; and (3) Mazaki Bussan should have
expected a product liability suit in the United States, while Nanka Seimen
may not have had any reason to expect a suit related to product liability to
be filed in Japan. 204 Given these extraordinary circumstances, the court
found that it was logical to try the case in the United States.205
201 Judgment of Jan. 29, 1991 (Mazaki Bussan K.K. v. Nanka Seimen Co.), Tokyo District Ct.,
1390 HANREI JIHO 98, summary English translation in 35 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L LAW 171 (1992).
202 The Code of Civil Procedure, art. 15, para. I ("A suit relating to a tort may be brought before
the court of the place where the act was committed.").
203 Product liability suits as such did not exist in Japan until Seizdbutsu Sekinin H6 [Product
Liability Act], Law No. 85 of 1994, was enacted on July 1, 1994. This Act became effective as of July 1,
1995.
204 Mazaki Bussan K.K.v. Nanka Seimen Co., 1390 HANREI JIHO at 100-01.
205 Id. at 99.
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Moreover, in determining the "extraordinary circumstances" in the
case, the court considered the legitimacy of Mazaki Bussan's motivation in
filing the reactive suit. The court then concluded that Mazaki Bussan insti-
tuted the suit to avoid a judgment in the United States with its strict product
liability standard, and to obtain a comparably favorable Japanese judgment.
Therefore, the court was concerned that:
if we were to always permit such practice, it may (i) undermine
the purpose of the recognition of foreign judgments as stipu-
lated in the Code of Civil Procedures, (ii) hinder the awarding
of substantial remedy to the injured . . . and (iii) eventually
result in the nonrecognition of Japanese judgments in a foreign
country on the ground of reciprocity. 206
c. Motion to stay and antisuit injunctions
Without statutory authorization, Japanese courts are reluctant to grant
a motion to stay. Thus far, no reported case indicates that a Japanese court
granted a motion to stay in deference to a foreign parallel litigation.
Typically, the court would deny a motion to stay on the ground that:
Under the Code of Civil Procedures, the court can stay its
proceeding only when the court is unable to perform its func-
tion (article 220) or a party cannot proceed with the court
proceeding due to an impediment (article 221). There is no
statutory authorization which enables the court to stay its
proceeding in the international parallel litigation situation. 207
Likewise, there is no specific statutory provision which authorizes Japanese
courts to issue antisuit or anti-antisuit injunction orders. 208 The concept of
the antisuit injunction is foreign to the Japanese court, and under no
circumstances will a Japanese court issue an antisuit injunction against a
206 Id. at 100-01.
207 Interlocutory Judgment of May 30, 1989 (Miyakoshi Kik6 K.K. v. Gould, Inc.), Tokyo District
Ct., 1348 HANREI JIH 91, 95.
208 As the domestic parallel litigation is explicitly prohibited and the later litigation will be
automatically dismissed in Japan, there is no need for a domestic antisuit injunction. See supra part
IV.A.I.
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foreign litigation. 209 Moreover, there has been no reported case in which a
party applied to a Japanese court for an antisuit or anti-antisuit injunction
order. 210
3. Scholars' Opinions
Within the tradition of civil law and continental jurisprudence of
Japan, the opinions of prominent Japanese scholars are highly respected and
have been influential in the Japanese legal practice. Therefore, a discussion
of Japanese parallel litigation would be incomplete without an examination
of the Japanese legal scholars' views in Japan.
a. Traditional views
In the past, Japanese scholars were reluctant to restrict international
parallel litigation. 2 11 They made a grudging exception in cases where a
foreign litigation reached a final and irrevocable judgment prior to the
Japanese litigation, and if the foreign judgment satisfied the requirements
for recognition in Japan. 212
209 Minji Hozen H6 [Civil Preservation Act], Law No. 91 of 1989, provides for various injunction
orders to be issued in preservation of the litigant's legal rights. Professor D6gauchi has suggested that a
Japanese court may issue an antisuit injunction based on this Act. Interview with Masato D6gauchi,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Tokyo, in Tokyo, Japan (Sept. 6, 1995). Also, one commentator
has suggested possible application of articles 23 & 24 of the Act. Shigeru Fuwa, Eibei no Saibanrei ni
Miru Kokusaiteki Soshj Sashitome (2) [Anglo-American Case Law on International Antisuit Injunctions
(2)], 18 EHIME HOGAKUKAI ZASSHI (vol. 4) 95, 132 (1992). Note, however, these injunctions are for the
preservation of substantive rights only, and not necessarily for the protection of a certain court proceeding.
Thus, Japanese courts would be reluctant to use this Act in procedural aspects, such as an injunction
against parallel proceedings.
210 D6gauchi, supra note 181, at 92 ("There has been no case in Japan ordering a party not to
continue a foreign proceeding or rejecting such an order.").
211 HAJIME KANEKO, MINJI SOSHO HO TAIKEI [SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF THE CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURES] 173 (Revised ed. 1967); Akira Takakuwa, Naikoku Hanketsu to Teishoku suru Gaikoku
Hanketsu no Sh6nin no Kahi [Whether or Not to Recognize the Foreign Judgment which Conflicts with the
Domestic Judgment], 155 NBL 6 (1978).
212 The Code of Civil Procedure, art. 200 provides:
"An irrevocable judgment rendered by a foreign court shall be valid only if the following
requirements are all satisfied:
(i) no law, no regulation, and no treaty denies the jurisdiction of the foreign court;
(ii) in cases where the Japanese defendant lost the litigation, she had been served a
summons by means other than a public notice, or, if not, she had a day in court;
(iii) the judgment rendered by the foreign court is not contrary to the public order or good
morals of Japan; and
(iv) reciprocity is guaranteed."
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However, the courts no longer adhere to the restrictive scholarly view
on the subject of parallel litigation. For instance, while both the Gould and
Shinagawa Hakurenga courts held that the word "court" in article 231 of
the Code of Civil Procedures does not include foreign courts, they neverthe-
less restricted international parallel litigation.2 13
b. Recognizability doctrine
Under the "recognizability doctrine," some scholars argue that the
Japanese litigation should be dismissed when (1) the foreign parallel litiga-
tion was filed prior to the Japanese litigation, and (2) the judgment to be
rendered by the foreign court will be recognized in Japan. 2 14 The underly-
ing premises of this doctrine are that, insofar as article 200 of the Code of
Civil Procedures obliges the court to recognize the validity of certain kinds
of foreign judgments, Japanese courts should respect certain kinds of
foreign proceedings even before a foreign judgment is rendered. In other
words, this doctrine purports theoretical consistency with the recognition of
a foreign judgment.2 15 Therefore, the focus of an analysis under the recog-
nizability doctrine is whether the foreign judgment to be rendered will
satisfy the requirements of the recognition in Japan, as articulated in article
200 of the Code of Civil Procedures. 2 16
In practice, however, it is difficult for a court to predict the likely out-
come of a foreign judgment.2 17 For example, the Gould court attempted to
apply the recognizability doctrine. However, the court could not dismiss
the proceeding before it, since the court could not predict with reasonable
certainty whether the U.S. parallel litigation would lead to a final and
It should be noted that in Japan a judgment is not "irrevocable" while an appellate review is pending.
Compare id. with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481(1) (1987) ("[A] final
judgment of a court of a foreign state . . is conclusive between parties, and is entitled to recognition in
courts in the United States.") and Comment e to the Restatement § 481(1) ("[a] judgment is subject to
appeal or to modification in light of changed circumstances does not deprive it of its character as a final
judgment.").
213 See supra part IV.A.I. & 2.
214 Masato D6gauchi, Kokusaiteki Sosh5 Kyjgd (5) [Concurrent Litigations in Int'l Civil
Procedure (pt. 5)], 100 HOGAKU KYOKAI ZASSHI (vol. 4) 715, 755-87 (1983); Takao Sawaki, Kokusaiteki
Soshd Kygd [International Parallel Litigation], in 7 SHIN JITSUMU MrNSO KozA [NEW SERIES OF STUDIES
ON CIVIL LITIGATION PRACTICE] 105 (1982). In Germany, the recognizability doctrine is upheld by case
law and the majority of scholars. Obuchi, supra note 5, at 8.
215 D6gauchi, supra note 214, at 742.
216 Id. at 755.
217 See infra part V.C.1.
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irrevocable judgment.218 Because of its practical disadvantage, this doctrine
seems hardly dominant in Japan today.2 19
c. Jurisdictional approach
Currently, the majority of the scholars take the interest-balancing
approach in international jurisdiction.220 Under this approach, the existence
of a foreign parallel litigation is one factor to be balanced against other
interests. This approach allows a flexible disposition of the Japanese paral-
lel litigation.221
It has been pointed out, however, that the interest-balancing approach
hinders the predictability of disposition and may result in conflicting judg-
ments. 222 The recent court cases, including Shinagawa Hakurenga and
Mazaki Bussan,223 which considered the existence of a foreign parallel liti-
gation as an "extraordinary circumstance" under the modified Malaysia
Airline standard, can be classified as a corollary to this approach.224
B. Legislative Proposal
Since July 1990, the Japanese government has been contemplating an
amendment to the Code of Civil Procedures. 225 In December 1991, the
Ministry of Justice published a paper addressing the various issues to be
dealt with in this amendment project (the "Issues to be Examined"), 226
which specifically addressed the following issues concerning international
218 Interlocutory Judgment of May 30, 1989 (Miyakoshi Kik6 K.K. v. Gould, Inc.), Tokyo District
Ct., 1348 HANREI JIHO 91,95. See also supra part V.A.I.
219 Sakai, supra note 14, at 39.
220 Kazunori Ishiguro, Gaikoku ni okeru Soshj Keizoku no Kokunaiteki K5ka [Domestic Impact of
a Litigation Pending Abroad], in KOKUSAI MINJI SOSHO NO RIRON [THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION] 323 (Takao Sawaki & Yoshimitsu Aoyama eds., 1987); Kobayashi, supra note 189, at 38;
Shigeru Fuwa, Kokusaiteki Soshd Ky6g5 no Kiritsu [Regulation of International Parallel Litigation], 17
EWME HOGAKUKAI ZASSHI (Vol. 1) 135 (1990).
221 Kobayashi, supra note 189, at 38.
222 D6gauchi, supra note 214, at 741.
223 See supra part IV.A.2.
224 Kobayashi, supra note 189, at 38.
225 The Code of Civil Procedure was originally enacted in 1890 and has been amended several
times. The currently contemplated amendment will be the most comprehensive in 70 years since the latest
comprehensive amendment in 1926. For an outline of the 1926 amendment, see KY6Z6 YUASA, ON THE
REVISED CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF JAPAN (1929); HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 160, § 1.03[2].
226 THE CIVIL BUREAU OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MINJI SOSHO TETSUZUKI NI KANSURU KENTO
JIKO_[ISSUES TO BE EXAMINED CONCERNING THE CIVIL PROCEDURE] (1991).
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parallel litigation: (1) Should any amendments be made concerning the
disposition of international parallel litigation? and (2) For instance, should
courts be authorized to stay their proceedings under certain conditions when
international parallel litigation is pending?
A variety of opinions have been explored concerning the Issues to be
Examined.227 With regard to the international parallel litigation issue,
although a majority concurred in the idea proposed in the Issues to be
Examined, a material number of dissenting opinions were also submitted.22 8
Reasons for the dissent include (1) it is not appropriate to enact a
provision regarding international parallel litigation under the current situ-
ation where scholars' opinions are split, (2) it is not appropriate for Japan to
enact a rule unilaterally, as the disposition of international parallel litigation
should be regulated in uniformity with other nations, and (3) it will hinder
the right of Japanese nationals if a court stays its proceeding because of
international parallel litigation. 229
After reviewing these opinions, in December 1993, the Ministry of
Justice published a tentative proposal for a protocol of the amendment (the
"Tentative Proposal").2 30 However, the Tentative Proposal noted the issues
of international parallel litigation in postnotes only, and did not include
them in the topics to be covered in the upcoming amendment. 23 1
In the postnote, the Ministry of Justice noted that "the issue of
authorizing the court to stay its proceeding under certain conditions when
international parallel litigation is pending will be further examined." 232
Factors to be examined include (1) possible hindrance to the rights of
Japanese nationals if the court stays its proceeding on the grounds of inter-
national parallel litigation, (2) adequacy of domestic legislation, in the
absence of any assurance that a foreign country will deal with this issue in a
similar way, and (3) the formulation of a clear set of standards for granting a
227 For example, the Japan Federation of Bar Associations published its opinion paper in July 1992.
NIPPON BENGOSHI RENGOKAI [THE JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS], "MINJI SOSHO TETSUZUKI
NI KANSURU KENTO JIKO" NI TAISURU IKENSHO [OPINION PAPER ON THE ISSUES TO BE EXAMINED
CONCERNING THE CIVIL PROCEDURE] (1992).
228 K6z6 Yanagida et al., "Minji Sosh Tetsuzuki ni kansuru Kentd Jik5" ni taisuru Kakukai Iken
no Gaij6 [Outline of the Various Opinions on the Issues to be Examined Concerning Civil Procedure], 524
NBL 44, 48 (1993).
229 Id.
230 THE CIVIL BUREAU OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MINJI SOSHO TETSUZUKI NI KANSURU KAISEI
YOKO SHIAN [TENTATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE PROTOCOL OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL PROCEDURES]
(I 993) [hereinafter THE TENTATIVE PROPOSALI.
231 Postnotes denote items to be considered in future amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure.
232 THE TENTATIVE PROPOSAL, supra note 230, at 48 n.2.
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stay.233 Out of the various opinions explored concerning the Tentative
Proposal, the number of the concurring opinions and dissenting opinions
was almost even.234
The Ministry of Justice is now working on the final protocol of the
amendment, which will be released in January 1996, and the amendment
may be enacted as early as summer 1996. Given these concerns, it is
unlikely that any provision concerning international parallel litigation will
survive the final protocol and be enacted in the course of the currently
contemplated amendment to the Code of Civil Procedures.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS
A. U.S. Federal Practice and Japanese Practice
1. Domestic Parallel Litigation Practices
With regard to domestic parallel litigation, Japan's need for domestic
parallel litigation is less compelling than that of the United States. That is
because the judicial systems of the two countries stand on opposite prem-
ises. The foundation for this difference is the existence of the dual system
of the federal and state judiciaries in the United States, contrasted with a
single judicial system in Japan, as well as the differences in the legal status
of the plaintiff.
In Japan, domestic parallel litigation per se is explicitly prohibited by
the statute, regardless of the legitimacy of the litigants' interests. 235 There
has been some concern that this strict prohibition undermines legitimate
interests of the litigant to pursue parallel proceedings. However, that has
not been the case in Japan. For example, the plaintiff may have a legitimate
motivation to file a repetitive suit when the defendant has assets in multiple
locations. 236 However, the plaintiff does not need to institute parallel liti-
gations in multiple courts of different locations within Japan, as a judgment
233 THE CIVIL BUREAU OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MINJI SOSHO TETSUZUKI NI KANSURU KAISEI
YOKO SHIAN HOSOKU SETSUMEI [SUPPLEMENTAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE TENTATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE
PROTOCOL OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE CIVIL PROCEDURE] 79 (1993) [hereinafter THE SUPPLEMENTAL
EXPLANATION].
234 K6z6 Yanagida et al., "Mini Sosho Tetsuzuki ni kansuru Kaisei Yjk Shian" ni taisuru Kakukai
Iken no Gaid [An Outline of the Various Opinions on the Tentative Proposal for the Protocol of the
Amendment to the Civil Procedure], 570 NBL 57, 60 (1995).
235 See supra part IV.A.I.
236 See supra part II.
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rendered by any Japanese court is enforceable throughout Japan, as long as
the judgment is final and irrevocable, or accompanied by a declaration for
temporary enforcement.237
On the other hand, a defendant may have a legitimate motivation to
file a reactive suit when she thinks the first forum is inadequate, or at least
disadvantageous, and she wishes to dispute the case in a more favorable
forum. 238 In Japan, however, this purpose would be served by a statutory
transfer under the Code of Civil Procedures. When a defendant believes
that (1) the court does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate, 239 or (2) such
transfer is necessary to avoid "extreme damage or delay," 240 the defendant
can move to transfer the case to another competent court. Accordingly, the
defendant would not have a legitimate motivation to file a domestic parallel
litigation in Japan.
By contrast, in the United States, litigants are basically free to insti-
tute a parallel litigation, subject to certain restrictions. 24 1 The reason for
this relative freedom is the federal system of the United States. As the
United States has both a federal judiciary and a state judiciary, a federal
court plaintiff whose claim is based on diversity will be advised to file a
backup action in a state court to prevent the statute of limitations from
expiring in the event the federal court finds no diversity. 242 Or, when a fed-
eral court has exclusive jurisdiction over a part of the plaintiffs claim, the
plaintiff may be required to file a part of her claim in a federal court and the
rest in a state court.243 These concerns make it necessary for a plaintiff to
file a repetitive suit in the United States.
Moreover, in Japan, all courts will apply virtually the same law.
Furthermore, judges are highly homogeneous, as they are mostly composed
of career judges, who were appointed as associate judges immediately upon
completing their legal studies, and thereafter, under the administration of
the Supreme Court of Japan, have been periodically relocated
237 Minji Shikk5 HJ (Civil Execution Act; Law No. 4 of 1979, as amended), art. 22.
238 Seesuprapart1.
239 Code of Civil Procedure, art. 30, para. I provides that: "Ifa court finds that the whole or a part
of a suit does not come under its jurisdiction, it shall transfer such suit to the proper court by ruling."
240 Code of Civil Procedure, art. 31, provides that: "If a court deems it necessary to avoid
considerable loss or delay concerning a case over which it has jurisdiction, such court may, upon a party's
motion or upon its own initiative, transfer the whole or a part of the case to another competent court, unless
the case falls under its exclusive jurisdiction."
241 See supra parts ilI.A. & B.
242 Gibson, supra note 9, at 203.
243 ld. at 204.
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nationwide. 244 Accordingly, a choice of forum in Japan simply means the
location of the court.
In contrast, in the United States, each state has its own conflict of law
rules and its own substantive law. Not only does the state court apply its
own law, but the federal courts are also obliged to apply the state's conflict
of law rules and substantive law.24 5 Moreover, judges are relatively local-
ized, as has been the tradition in common law countries. 246 In addition,
jurors are most likely selected locally, and are usually said to be less sympa-
thetic to aliens. Under these circumstances, the choice of forum may not be
only an issue of location, but can be also an issue of the applicable law,
quality of the judges, and desirability of the jury.247
Another reason for the differences in the two systems can be attrib-
uted to the relative significance of the plaintiffs status. In the United
States, as one commentator noted, "there would seem to be a tactical advan-
tage in being a plaintiff."248 He specifically pointed out that: (1) juries
normally react in a more favorable manner to requests for relief from a
plaintiff than from a defendant; (2) there are some procedural advantages
for the plaintiff in the conduct of a lawsuit; and (3) the plaintiff has more
control over the suit than does the defendant. 249 These concerns will
encourage the defendant to file a reactive suit in the United States. In
contrast, there is no jury system in Japan, and, due to the continental civil
law tradition, the judge will assume relatively extensive responsibility and
initiative in managing the lawsuit. Accordingly, being a plaintiff or a
defendant makes little difference in Japan.
Because of the fundamental differences in the judicial systems of the
two countries, litigants in the United States have greater incentives to file a
parallel litigation in another court than is the case in Japan. The greater the
incentives for a parallel litigation, the greater the necessity to authorize it.
244 See, e.g., HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 160, § 3.02[4].
245 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (1941) (extending Erie doctrine to
require that federal courts also apply the forum state's choice of law rules).
246 See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1677, 1678 (1990) ("[U]nlike the
civil law system, in which the identity of the judge is much less a matter of public record or significance,
the common law system's focus on the judge increases the availability of forum shopping.") (footnote
omitted).
247 See id. ("Among the considerations that may motivate a forum shopper are the convenience or
expense of litigating in the forum, the inconvenience to one's adversary, the probable or expected
sympathies of a potential jury pool, the nature and availability of appellate review, judicial calendars and
backlogs, local rules, permissibility of fee-splitting arrangements, and virtually any other interjurisdictional
difference.").
248 Vestal, supra note 3, at 13.
249 Id. at 13-14.
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2. International Parallel Litigation Practices
a. Structural similarities
Within the international parallel litigation context, the United States
and Japan start from a similar premise. That is, international parallel litiga-
tion is in principle permissible, but both countries lack statutory provisions
which specifically deal with international parallel litigation. From this
starting point, the U.S. federal courts and Japanese courts have developed
frameworks to restrict international parallel litigation, which resemble each
other to some extent.
The structural similarity between the U.S. and Japanese international
parallel litigation practices is in contrast to the domestic parallel litigation
practices, where two countries start from completely opposite premises.
The reason for this contrast can easily be identified. In dealing with foreign
parallel litigation issues, the Japanese courts abandon the-basic premises of
domestic parallel litigation and take the opposite propositions, while U.S.
federal courts maintain the basic premises of domestic parallel litigation.
As noted above, the rationale for prohibiting domestic parallel litiga-
tion in Japan is the presumption that domestic litigants would have no
legitimate interest in filing a parallel litigation. 2 50 However, in an interna-
tional context, a judgment rendered by a Japanese court is not necessarily
enforceable in a foreign jurisdiction as such, without a special and time-
consuming proceeding. Further, there is no assurance that the Japanese
judgment will be eventually recognized by a foreign court. Accordingly,
under certain cases, a plaintiff may have a legitimate motivation to file a
parallel international litigation in Japan. 25 1
Moreover, the statutory transfer under the Japanese Code of Civil
Procedures is limited to another Japanese court only. 252 Therefore, a defen-
dant may have a legitimate motivation to file a reactive suit, if she believes
the first forum is inadequate or disadvantageous, and she wishes to dispute
.the case in a more favorable forum.253
In addition, compared to domestic parallel litigation, there may be a
greater incentive to file a foreign parallel litigation. In international
250 See supra notes 236-40 and accompanying text.
251 See supra part II.
252 See supra notes 239-40.
253 See supra part i1.
VOL. 5 No. I
INTERNATIONAL PARALLEL LITIGATION
litigation, it is conceivable that the qualification and characteristics of the
judges are widely varied. Furthermore, it is highly likely that a foreign
court will apply its own conflict of law rules and may choose its own
substantive law, which the Japanese court will not choose.
There is another reason that compels U.S. federal and Japanese courts
to allow the filing of a domestic litigation in cases where a parallel litigation
is pending abroad. In the domestic parallel litigation situation, another
domestic forum is available if a court declines to adjudicate a case before it.
Restriction of domestic parallel litigation does not deprive a national of the
right to litigate in her home forum. In contrast, in the international parallel
litigation situation, if a court declines to adjudicate a case, litigants are
forced to litigate the case in a foreign forum. In other words, if a court
restricts international parallel litigation, the court may fail to provide a
forum to its national.
In several cases, U.S. federal courts have shown a strong presumption
for U.S. courts' obligation to provide a home forum to U.S. citizens.254
Although Japanese courts have never explicitly referred to such presump-
tions, reactions to the Ministry of Justice's legislative proposal indicate that
the Japanese legal community is also concerned about the Japanese
national's right to sue in a Japanese court.255 Accordingly, the protection of
the court's own national would be another rationale for the similar premises
of U.S. and Japanese international parallel litigation practices.
Under these circumstances, the choice of forum may not be only an
issue of location, but can be also a question of the applicable law and of the
quality of judges and the jury.256 As a result, there is a greater necessity to
authorize a foreign parallel litigation than there is for domestic litigation.
These considerations justify the Japanese courts' willingness to allow inter-
national parallel litigation. In contrast, U.S. federal courts need not change
their premises because the foregoing is the very logic underlying the
domestic parallel litigation practice.
254 See, e.g., Fields v. Sedgwick Associated Risks, 796 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1986); DeMelo v. Toche
Marine, 711 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984)
("Plaintiff's residence may well play an important role in determining the propriety of entertaining a suit
against the defendant in the forum.").
255 Yanagida et al., supra note 228, at 48 ("Ifa Japanese court stays its proceeding on the ground of
international parallel litigation, it will hinder the rights of Japanese nationals."); THE SUPPLEMENTAL
EXPLANATION, supra note 233, at 79 ("It should be further considered whether it will hinder the right of
Japanese nationals if the court stays its proceeding on the ground of international parallel litigation.").
256 Cf supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
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b. Differences between US. and Japanese practices
Although the basic premises are similar, there are some remarkable
differences between the U.S. and Japanese practices. The U.S. federal
courts are eager to exercise their "inherent" power and are flexible in the
disposition of their proceedings. On the contrary, the Japanese courts
confine their power within the statutory authorization, as the courts are
reluctant to exercise power not explicitly granted by a statutory provision.
First, to defer to a proceeding of a foreign court, U.S. federal courts
have employed the doctrines of forum non conveniens and lis alibi pendens,
which are addressed separately from the issue of the federal court's interna-
tional jurisdiction. The consequence of a forum non conveniens dismissal
may be equivalent to that of a lis alibi pendens stay, insofar as the federal
court often grants a conditional dismissal.
In Japan, courts have recently taken the jurisdictional approach, under
which the issue of foreign parallel litigation is addressed within the frame-
work of the Japanese court's international jurisdiction. The core of this
approach is interest balancing, which is largely similar to the U.S. doctrine
offorum non conveniens.257 However, the consequence of the jurisdictional
approach will be more drastic than that of forum non conveniens. Because
Japanese courts have only the simple choice of granting or denying an
unconditional dismissal, Japanese courts cannot grant a conditional
dismissal while U.S. federal courts can. In addition, Japanese courts decline
to grant stays without an explicit statutory authorization.
Second, to protect their own proceedings, U.S. federal courts may
issue antisuit or anti-antisuit injunction orders, while no such device is
available to Japanese courts to protect their own jurisdiction against foreign
proceedings.
B. Suggestions Concerning US. Federal Practices
1. Consideration of Legitimate Motivations and Negative Effects
For the most part, the doctrines of forum non conveniens, interna-
tional comity, and lis alibi pendens have enabled the U.S. courts to reach a
fair and just disposition of their cases. In particular, private and public
interest factors, which the courts balance under the doctrine of forum non
257 D6gauchi, supra note 181, at 85.
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conveniens dismissal or lis alibi pendens stay, adequately address any
negative effects that may prompt the restriction of an international parallel
litigation. Negative effects include duplicative costs and other burdens, and
the waste of judicial resources.258
In most cases, however, federal courts have failed to consider one
important aspect: the possibility of contradicting judgments.259  When
considering a dismissal or stay for international comity, the federal courts
should carefully examine whether a foreign judgment on the merits will
eventually be recognized and enforced in the United States. 260 If the
foreign judgment does not meet the requirements for recognition and
enforcement,26 1 there will be no danger to international comity.262 Rather,
under such circumstances, it would be necessary for the plaintiff in the
foreign litigation to file a repetitive suit in the United States, as long as she
wishes to enforce a judgment against the defendant's assets both in the
United States and in the foreign country. The federal litigation should not
be stayed or dismissed for international comity, where the prospective
foreign judgment on the merits would lack the requirements for recognition
in the United States. As the federal court will face the international comity
258 See supra parts l.B. &C.
259 Obuchi, supra note 5, at 3 ("[Tlhe Anglo-American position, in most cases, fails to take into
account the probability of recognizability of an expected foreign judgment .... "). Cf RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(e) (1987) ("A court in the United States need not recognize
a judgment of the court of a foreign state if ... the judgment conflicts with another judgment that is
entitled to recognition .... ).
260 The Seventh Circuit is an exception in this regard. The court observed that "consideration of
judicial economy, especially the need to avoid piecemeal litigation strongly favored staying the district
court proceedings. The Belgian suit, which had begun before the American action was filed, had been
brought to a conclusion in the trial court. Absent reversal on appeal, that judgment would adjudicate the
rights of the parties. At that point, unless there was a barrier to the recognition of that judgment in the
United States and, as we discuss below, there was little chance of that contingency, there would be no need
for further proceedings in the district court." Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 685-
86 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). This observation is attributable to the unique
setting of the Ingersoll case, in which the defendant explicitly requested the enforcement of the Belgian
judgment in the United States. Under the ordinary setting of international parallel litigation, where the
litigants will not specifically seek the recognition of the foreign judgment, the federal court most likely
would not consider the recognizability of the foreign judgment.
261 Under Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the recognition and enforcement of the foreign
judgment is a matter of state law, though many states enacted the Uniform Money-Judgment Recognition
Act, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1986). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481-
482 (1987); DAVID EPSTEIN & JEFFEREY L. SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO
JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND STRATEGY §§ 11.01-11.10 (2d ed. 1994).
262 In Turner, the court pointed out that "once a judgment on the merit is reached in one of the
cases,. . . failure to defer to the judgment would have serious implications for the concerns of international
comity. For example, the prospect of 'dueling courts,' conflicting judgment, and attempts to enforce
conflicting judgments raise major concerns of international comity." Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto
Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1521 (11 th Cir. 1994).
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issue only after the foreign court has rendered its judgment on the merits, it
would not be difficult to determine whether such judgment is recognizable.
More importantly, federal courts have been reluctant to address the
issue of whether a litigant has a legitimate motivation in instituting a paral-
lel litigation. As noted earlier, in regulating parallel litigation, a court
should balance the degree of undesirable effects against the legitimacy of
motivations.263 Accordingly, if a federal court wishes to justify its disposi-
tion of a parallel litigation, it is imperative to clearly address the issue of
legitimacy of the motivation, which is the rationale behind deregulation, and
balance it against the negative effects, which is the rationale behind
regulation.
There is one way in which the U.S. federal courts may address the
issue of legitimacy of the motivation: follow the jurisdictional approach of
the Japanese courts. As articulated in Gilbert, the forum non conveniens
analysis includes an examination of "all other practical problems that make
trials of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." 264 Given the practical
similarity between the structure for interest balancing under the U.S. forum
non conveniens analysis and that under the Japanese jurisdictional
approach, U.S. federal courts may safely consult the Japanese case law.
Japanese courts consider both the legitimate motivations of the litigants, as
well as the negative effects of parallel litigation, including the possibility of
contradicting judgments. 265
2. Restrictive Use ofAntisuit Injunctions
The protectionist approach of liberally granting antisuit injunctions,
such as that manifested in Seattle Totems or Cargill,266 is still prevalent
among the U.S. federal courts. 267 In fact, the Sixth Circuit observed that, as
263 See supra parts I & 11.
264 GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
265 See supra part IV.A.2.
266 See supra part III.C.4.
267 For instance, about seven months after the Laker decision, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York still maintained a liberal approach similar to Seattle Totems and Cargill, despite its
reference to the Laker decision. American Home Assurance Co. v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 603 F.
Supp. 636, 642-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). In his decisions rendered in 1993, Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit repeatedly expressed his strong inclination to the liberal approach. Phillips Medical Systems Int'l
B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 1993); Allendale Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Inc., 10
F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993). As late as June 1994, the District Court for the Northern District of California
cited Seattle Totems as decisive authority. Robinson v. Jardine Ins. Brokers Int'l Ltd., 856 F. Supp. 554,
560 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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of February 1992, this protectionist approach was still good law in the Fifth
and the Ninth Circuits, where a duplication of the parties and issues alone
would generally be sufficient to justify the issuance of an antisuit
injunction.2 68
In the increasingly interdependent world of a global economy, such
an interference with foreign courts shall constitute a violation of foreign
judicial sovereignty. The principle underlying the concept of sovereignty is
that each country should be able to enjoy its judicial sovereignty within its
territory, and, in turn, every country should be obliged to respect others'
judicial sovereignty. 269 Antisuit injunction orders, though addressed to the
parties and not to the foreign court itself, threaten the foreign judicial sov-
ereignty. 270 When an antisuit injunction is issued, the foreign court is
deprived of the opportunity to exercise its jurisdiction.27 1 Moreover, it is
conceivable that both the domestic court and the foreign court could issue
antisuit injunctions against each other. In such a case, neither court will be
able to proceed any further. 272 The more liberally a court issues antisuit
injunctions, the more likely it is that a deadlock might result.
Based on the foregoing considerations, especially in due considera-
tion for international comity, courts should decide carefully whether they
should permit proceedings in their jurisdiction to continue, and restrict the
issuance of antisuit injunctions as much as possible.
268 Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1992).
269 For example, in Malaysia Airline, the Supreme Court of Japan held that "the judicial
jurisdiction of one country is a part of its sovereignty and the scope of the judicial sovereignty shall be the
same as that of the sovereignty, and the Japanese judicial jurisdiction in principle shall not extend to a
foreign corporation ...." Judgment of Oct. 16, 1981 (Malaysia Airline System Berhad v. Got6), Saik6sai
[Supreme Court], 35 Minshii 1224, 1226.
270 China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987) ("The fact
that the injunction operates only against the parties, and not directly against the foreign court, does not
eliminate the need for due regard to principles of international comity, because such an order effectively
restricts the jurisdiction of the court of a foreign sovereign.") (citation omitted).
271 Gau Shan, 956 F.2d at 1355 ("[A]ntisuit injunctions are even more destructive of international
comity than, for example, refusals to enforce foreign judgment. At least in the latter context foreign courts
are given the opportunity to exercise their jurisdiction. Antisuit injunctions, on the other hand, deny
foreign courts the right to exercise their proper jurisdiction.").
272 ld at 1354-55 ("In a case in which parties to an international transaction file separate suits in
different forums, the availability of antisuit injunctions present the possibility that no relief will be granted.
If both the foreign court and the United States court issue injunctions preventing their respective nationals
from prosecuting a suit in the foreign forum, both actions will be paralyzed and neither party will be able to
obtain any relief.").
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C. Suggestions Concerning Japanese Practices
1. Recognizability Doctrine Versus Jurisdictional Approach
Although early case law and scholars' traditional views in Japan
tended to avoid restricting international parallel litigation, in recent cases
the Japanese courts have acknowledged the necessity of regulating interna-
tional parallel litigation. There are two possible frameworks under which
the Japanese courts can regulate international parallel litigation: the recog-
nizability doctrine and the jurisdictional approach. The jurisdictional
approach, which balances various interests within the arena of jurisdiction,
would be the more appropriate framework of the two.
As noted earlier, the regulation of parallel litigation depends upon the
balancing of the extent of its undesirable effects against the degree of
legitimacy of the motivation. 273 The justifications for restricting parallel
litigation include (1) protection of the litigants against duplicative costs and
other burdens, (2) judicial economy (that is, the prevention of waste of
judicial resources), and (3) avoidance of contradicting judgments.2 7 4 On the
other hand, litigants' motivations may be deemed legitimate where (1) in
the repetitive type of suit, the plaintiff intends to execute a judgment in
multiple jurisdictions or, (2) in the reactive type of suit, the first forum is
inadequate or disadvantageous for the defendant, and the defendant wishes
to litigate the case in a more favorable forum.275
Generally, the recognizability doctrine is effective in avoiding
contradicting judgments.276 However, once it is determined that a foreign
parallel litigation will result in a recognizable judgment, this doctrine auto-
matically favors the proceeding which was filed first. In other words, where
a foreign litigation has been filed prior to the Japanese parallel litigation, the
Japanese court would be obliged to dismiss its action, as long as the court
finds that the judgment to be rendered in the foreign forum will be recog-
nizable in Japan. Here, it is obvious that the recognizability doctrine would
necessarily fail to consider the degree of undesirable effects, other than
those of contradicting judgments and the degree of legitimacy in
273 See supra part .
274 See supra part I.
275 See supra part 11.
276 In fact, the avoidance of contradicting judgments seems to be the primary purpose in the
recognizability doctrine. Obuchi, supra note 5, at 62 ("The German scholars usually emphasize decisional
harmony .... On the other hand, the Anglo-American case law positions seem to consider the policies of
prevention of vexation and litigation economy, but not the policy of decisional harmony.").
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motivations behind the parallel litigation. Further, as the recognizability
doctrine always gives preference to a preceding litigation, it may compel a
race to the institution of lawsuits and may result in forum shopping.277
In contrast, under the jurisdictional approach, the need for an interna-
tional parallel litigation itself is considered as one of the "extraordinary
circumstances" that would modify the literal application of the Malaysia
Airline standard. In its province of "extraordinary circumstances," the
jurisdictional approach can facilitate the interest balancing of all of the
legitimate motivations against the negative effects. In fact, in Mazaki
Bussan,278 the court balanced the negative effects against the legitimacy of
motivation.279
In addition, this approach can accommodate the need to examine the
recognizability of a foreign judgment. Where (1) the foreign parallel litiga-
tion was filed prior to the Japanese litigation, and (2) it is highly likely that
Japanese courts will recognize the judgment to be rendered in the foreign
forum, Japanese courts will tend to defer to the foreign parallel litigation.
Note, however, that the recognizability of a foreign judgment is not neces-
sarily a decisive factor under the jurisdictional approach. 280
Furthermore, the recognizability doctrine inevitably accompanies
difficulty in its actual application. If a Japanese court were to apply this
doctrine, the court must decide the recognizability of a foreign judgment
long before a foreign court actually renders the judgment. In a practical
sense, the court will face material difficulty in determining the recogniz-
ability of a foreign judgment which has not been rendered yet.281 For
example, it will be difficult for the court to predict with certainty whether or
not (1) the procedure leading to the judgment violates the Japanese public
policy, (2) the contents of the judgment to be rendered violate the Japanese
public policy, and (3) the reciprocity rule exists between the Japanese and
277 Yoshihisa Hayakawa, Kokusaiteki Soshd kydg5 wo 'Tokudan no Jy5" no Hitotsu toshite
Kokusaiteki Saiban Kankatsu wo Hitei shita Jirei, [A Case that Declined the International Jurisdiction,
Having Considered an International Parallel Litigation as a Factor of "'Extraordinary Circumstances"]
1007 JURISTO 168, 169 (1992).
278 Judgment of Jan. 29, 1991 (Mazaki Bussan K.K. v. Nanka Seimen Co.), Tokyo District Ct.,
1390 HANREI JIHO 98, summary English translation in 35 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L LAW 171 (1992).
279 See supra notes 204 & 206 and accompanying text.
280 Obuchi, supra note 5, at 90 ("Recognizability of the foreign judgment can be very important.
The more probable it is that a foreign judgment will be recognized, the stronger is the requirement of
decisional harmony, the less legitimate the interest of the plaintiff in initiating the second action ....
However, this factor is not necessarily decisive.").
281 KAzuNoRI ISHIGURO, I GENDAI KOKUSAI SHIHO [MODERN CONFLICT OF LAWS IN JAPAN] 632
(1986); Obuchi, supra note 5, at 99 ("Predicting recognizability of the expected foreign judgment with
certainty is very difficult, or often almost impossible.").
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the foreign jurisdiction. All three of these concerns are the very same
factors noted as relevant in determining recognizability of the foreign judg-
ment in Japan under article 200 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 28 2
In addition to the difficulty of predicting the outcome of a foreign
judgment, there is also the lack of any assurance that the court deciding the
recognizability of a foreign judgment may come to the same conclusion as
would the Japanese court, which will later decide whether to recognize the
judgment rendered in a foreign court.23 Suppose a Japanese court
dismissed its action because (1) the foreign parallel litigation was filed first,
and (2) the judgment to be rendered by the foreign court will be recogniz-
able in Japan. Further suppose the foreign parallel litigation eventually
reaches a judgment on the merits. When a litigant later seeks recognition of
the said foreign judgment in Japan, its recognizability will in most cases be
decided not by the court, which dismissed the Japanese parallel litigation,
but by another court. Further complicating the matter, Japanese public
policy or the reciprocity rule may have changed since the dismissal of the
Japanese parallel litigation. 28 4 Given these possible factors, it is conceiv-
able that the latter court may deny the recognizability of the said foreign
judgment, notwithstanding the contrary decision rendered earlier by another
Japanese court.
It is true that a clear set of standards for interest balancing under the
jurisdictional approach is yet to be established. Litigants cannot be sure
whether their particular setting constitutes "extraordinary circumstances."
Nevertheless, this defect in the jurisdictional approach is less significant
than the inherent defects in the recognizability doctrine. Moreover, since
the majority of the recent lower court cases have adopted the jurisdictional
approach, the case law will gradually establish a set of standards for interest
balancing in the international parallel litigation situation.
2. Introduction of Statutory Stays
When a Japanese court decides to defer to a foreign parallel litigation,
the only currently available disposition is the unconditional dismissal of its
action. Otherwise, the Japanese court is obliged to proceed with its
282 See supra note 212.
283 Dfgauchi, supra note 181, at 91 (admitting that the decision regarding the likelihood of
recognition of the future foreign judgment may differ among judges.)
284 See Obuchi, supra note 5, at 91 (emphasizing the difficulty of predicting whether or not the
future judgment will be consistent with public policy).
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litigation. In other words, Japanese courts cannot just stop and see what
will happen in the foreign parallel litigation. Under such a system, Japanese
courts will sometimes face the tough decision of whether or not they should
defer their proceedings to foreign courts, despite the difficulty of precisely
predicting the outcome of the foreign litigation. 285 As an unconditional
dismissal will drastically harm the plaintiff, Japanese courts will tend to
retain jurisdiction and proceed with litigation before them, unless they are
convinced that interest balancing definitely favors the foreign parallel liti-
gation. 28 6 Thus, even in cases where a Japanese court believes that interest
balancing favors the foreign parallel litigation, unless it is convinced
beyond any doubt, the court will retain jurisdiction and proceed to a
judgment.
If a stay or a conditional dismissal were available, in cases where a
Japanese court believes that interest balancing favors the foreign parallel
litigation, the court will be able to stop its proceeding and monitor how the
foreign parallel litigation is proceeding. 287 In other words, stays and condi-
tional dismissals would allow a temporary, not final, deference to the
foreign court. These devices will give Japanese courts some latitude in their
decision-making with regard to international parallel litigation. 288
In addition, an introduction of stays will reduce the number of antisuit
injunctions against the Japanese litigation issued by foreign courts. In the
absence of a statutory provision authorizing a stay or a conditional
dismissal, a Japanese court will defer to a foreign court only when interest
balancing clearly favors the foreign forum. In contrast, if a stay or a condi-
tional dismissal were available, a Japanese court can defer a "gray" case,
which otherwise would not have been deferred. Accordingly, the foreign
court would be encouraged to let the Japanese court decide on the adequacy
of the Japanese litigation, rather than to unilaterally issue an antisuit
injunction.
285 For example, there may be a case in which, after a Japanese court dismisses a litigation before
it, a foreign court also dismisses its litigation on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or forum non
conveniens. Kobayashi, supra note 189, at 40.
286 Obuchi, supra note 5, at 98 ("Dismissal is drastic and a high degree of need is required. Thus, it
can be used when recognizability of the foreign judgment is almost certain, or when there is a high
probability of recognizability and some special factors such as inconvenience in the domestic forum
exist.").
27 Id. ("The remedy of stay is less drastic and less rigorous conditions are required .... Thus,
when there is some probability of recognition and there are no such special factors as inconvenience in the
forum, etc., there is need of staying to await the foreign judgment ... ").
288 D6gauchi, supra note 181, at 86 (lack of a stay option "makes it difficult for a Japanese court to
deal with cases in a flexible manner.").
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In Japan, the use of stays or conditional dismissals will require new
legislation, since Japanese courts have been traditionally reluctant to exer-
cise nonstatutory power. Statutory stays will be more appropriate than
conditional dismissals, since Japanese courts are familiar with a stay of their
proceedings, though in a different context,289 while conditional dismissals
are completely unknown in Japan. According to the Supreme Court's
statistics, forty-eight out of eight High Courts and fifty District Courts were
in favor of an introduction of statutory stays in international parallel litiga-
tion, while only one court was against the introduction of this concept.290
These statistics indicate that a vast majority of the Japanese judges want the
authority to grant a statutory stay in international parallel litigation.
As observed earlier, the Japanese Ministry of Justice once proposed a
statutory stay in deference to a foreign parallel litigation during the debate
over the amendment of the Japanese civil procedures. Because of the
substantial number of dissents, the Ministry of Justice withdrew the
proposal.291 The proposal has been tabled by the Ministry of Justice until it
can satisfactorily answer the following questions: (1) whether the statutory
stay in deference to a proceeding in a foreign court will jeopardize the rights
of Japanese nationals; (2) whether it is appropriate to deal with international
parallel litigation by domestic legislation, in the absence of any assurance
that foreign countries will deal with this issue in a similar way; and (3) how
to formulate a set of clear standards for granting a stay.292
However, these concerns are not significant enough to deter the intro-
duction of statutory stays in deference to a foreign parallel litigation. None
of the concerns which the dissents and the Ministry of Justice have voiced is
decisive, and there is no material reason which excludes the introduction of
statutory stays from the current civil procedure amendment project in Japan.
The first concern of the dissents and the Ministry of Justice is that, if
a court stays its proceeding because of international parallel litigation, it
289 See supra notes 239 & 240.
290 Nine courts did not express their views. CIVIL AFFAIRS BUREAU OF THE SUPREME COURT,
MINJI SOSHO TETSUZUKI NI KANSURU KAISEI Y6KO SHIAN NI TAISURU KAKU SAIBANSHO NO IKEN
[OPINIONS OF EACH COURT ON THE TENTATIVE PROPOSAL FOR THE PROTOCOL OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE
CIVIL PROCEDURE] 142 (1994).
291 See supra part IV.B.
292 THE SUPPLEMENTAL EXPLANATION, supra note 233, at 79. In the Supreme Court's statistics,
the dissenting court also expressed similar concerns. THE CIVIL AFFAIRS BUREAU OF THE SUPREME
COURT, supra note 290, at 143 ("The legislation requires careful considerations, as it concerns the right of
access to the court, and there is a problem as to how requirements for a stay should be formulated. Where
there is no assurance of reciprocity, it is inappropriate to introduce a statutory stay in our civil procedure by
domestic legislation.").
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will jeopardize the rights of Japanese nationals. This is only a speculation,
however. As long as a court does not abuse its power to grant a stay, the
Japanese national's right to a home forum will not be disturbed unduly. In
the United States, for example, although federal courts often stay or condi-
tionally dismiss litigations before them, it is rarely contended that the stay
or the conditional dismissal hinders the rights of U.S. nationals. 293 This is
because federal courts maintain a strong presumption for a U.S. national's
right to litigate in American courts, notwithstanding the availability of a
stay and a conditional dismissal.294
As is the case in the United States, there is no reason to believe that
Japanese courts will not carefully exercise their power to grant a stay, and
jeopardize the right of Japanese nationals. First, forty-eight out of fifty-
eight courts expressed a positive view for the introduction of stays.295 This
implies that many Japanese judges are confident about their ability to
squarely exercise their judicial authority. Second, Japanese courts have
already dealt with the issue of whether or not to dismiss a litigation in
deference to a foreign parallel litigation. 296 Here, the danger to the right of
Japanese nationals is more imminent than it is in the case of a stay. This is
because once the Japanese litigation is dismissed, litigants have no choice
but to litigate the case abroad, while in the case of a stay the Japanese liti-
gation may be revived and litigants can litigate the case in Japan again.
Japanese judges have not abused their power to dismiss. In fact, there has
not been any contention that the right of Japanese nationals has been
hindered by a dismissal under the jurisdictional approach.
The dissents and the Ministry of Justice further question whether it is
appropriate to deal with international parallel litigation by domestic legisla-
tion, where there is no rule of reciprocity. The dissents specifically contend
that it is not appropriate for Japan to unilaterally enact the provision
because the disposition of international parallel litigation should be regu-
lated harmoniously among nations.297
Ideally, all nations should agree on the rules and procedures for
disposing international parallel litigations. It should be noted, however, that
realization of this ideal requires an international convention to this effect.
To date, there has been no international convention which deals with the
293 See supra part IlI.CI.
294 See supra part V.A.2.
295 See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
296 See supra part IV.A.
297 Yanagida et al., supra note 228, at 48.
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uniform disposition of transnational parallel litigations. The Brussels
Convention provides for a uniform treatment of parallel litigation within the
European Union.298 The Brussels Convention, however, was articulated
based on the EEC Treaty, and it does not intend to expand its application
beyond the boundary of the European Union.299
The Brussels Convention is limited in other ways. It is apparent that
the Brussels Convention adopts the "first to file" doctrine, 300 which, in
effect, prohibits parallel litigation within the European Union. Underlying
the prohibition against parallel litigation within the European Union are two
unique factors: (1) the European Union consists of relatively homogeneous
countries 30 1 and (2) the Brussels Convention itself simplified formalities
governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments among
European Union countries.302 Thus, similar to the situation in Japan where
298 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.
Sept. 27, 1968, reprinted in EPSTEIN & SNYDER, supra note 261, at A191-204 [hereinafter Brussels
Convention]. The Convention in pertinent part provides that:
Art. 21 [Pendency of concurrent suits in different States]
Where suits having the same object and the same basis between the same parties are brought before
courts of different Contracting States, the court in which the later suit is brought shall ex officio yield
jurisdiction in favor of the court where the action was first brought.
Art. 22 [Interrelationship between suits in different States]
Where related suits brought before courts of different Contracting States are still pending before the
courts having original jurisdiction, the court in which the later suit was brought may stay the proceedings.
The court in which the later suit was brought may also, at the request of one of the parties, declare
that it lacks jurisdiction if the law permits a joinder of related suits and the court in which the suit was first
brought has jurisdiction over both suits.
Suits are related, within the meaning of this article, if the relationship between them is so close that
there is reason to try and to decide them at the same time in order to avoid results that could be in conflict
if the decisions were reached separately.
Art. 23 [Exclusive jurisdiction of several courts]
Where suits are within the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, the court in which the later suit was
brought shall yield jurisdiction in favor of the court in which suit was first brought.
299 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY], art. 220
("Member State shall so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing
for the benefit of their nationals:
- the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments
of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.").
300 Brussels Convention, supra note 298, art. 21.
301 Although there would still be material differences among member states with regard to the
procedural laws, the substantive laws, and the judicial systems, especially between the common law
countries including the United Kingdom and the civil law countries including Germany, I assume that the
European Union is also working to achieve more uniformity in this respect, including the establishment of
the European Court of Justice, a judicial authority superior to national judiciaries.
302 Brussels Convention, supra note 298, art. 26 ("A judgment given in one Contracting State shall
be recognized in the Other Contracting States, without requiring special proceedings for this purpose.") &
art. 34 ("The court to which the request [for enforcement of a foreign judgment] is addressed shall rule
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a domestic parallel litigation is prohibited, litigants in the European Union
have little legitimacy in instituting a parallel litigation. 30 3
In a sense, the European Union aims at a unified political and
economical entity akin to the United States. Thus, the Brussels Convention
resembles the Conflict of Jurisdiction Model Act, which is now being
proposed to achieve a uniform treatment among states in the United
States. 304 For that same reason, the Brussels Convention is unlike the
Hague Service Convention305 or the Hague Evidence Convention,306 both of
which purport a worldwide harmonization of certain aspects of civil proce-
dures.
Similar to the underlying circumstances of the Brussels Convention,
harmonizing the international parallel litigation practice worldwide requires
the harmonization of the various nations' legal systems at the same time.
Both the substantive and procedural laws, as well as the judicial systems,
should be dramatically simplified to enable a sure and simple set of proce-
dures for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. No doubt this
kind of project requires tremendous effort and time, and is unlikely to be
achieved in the near future. In fact, as of yet, there is no project which is
aimed at worldwide harmonization of the parallel litigation practice.
Meanwhile, with rapidly expanding international business transac-
tions, Japanese. courts are confronted with an increasing number of
international parallel litigation cases. If the Japanese courts wait for an
international convention for worldwide harmonization, they will continue.to
suffer from the lack of power to stay international parallel litigation cases
pending before them. The continuing pressure toward the resolution of the
increasingly difficult international cases compels the postponement of the
idealistic approach of worldwide harmonization. In fact, this pressure man-
dates a compromised solution to deal with the reality of the transnational
world. The Japanese legislature should make a unilateral decision to
authorize its courts with power to stay parallel litigation cases.
without delay and without giving the judgment debtor an opportunity to enter his plea at this stage of the
proceedings.").
303 Compare with supra part V.A. I.
304 See Spencer Waller, Forum Selection: Model Act Provides a Solution, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29,
1990, at 17, col. 1. See also Teitz, supra note 30.
305 The Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361-73, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
306 The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555.
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Finally, the Ministry of Justice is concerned with the problems of
formulating a set of clear standards for granting a stay. Admittedly, it is
difficult to formulate detailed provisions in statutory terms. However, the
statute could state: "The court may, at the request of one of the parties,
order a stay of the proceedings, if (1) a parallel litigation is pending abroad,
(2) there is a possibility that a foreign judgment may be recognized in
Japan, and (3) there are certain circumstances under which the deferral to
the foreign court is adequate." 307
Such a general and vague formulation might make the Japanese
judges feel uncomfortable. It should be noted here, however, that under the
jurisdictional approach, Japanese courts are required to interpret and apply a
standard formulated as "extraordinary circumstances under which the
conference of jurisdiction will violate the idea of facilitating equity among
parties, and fair and speedy litigation." 308 This considerably general and
vague formulation notwithstanding, the majority of the recent Japanese
courts have relied upon the jurisdictional approach. In fact, courts have
been gradually establishing a more detailed guideline as to how a court
should apply the "extraordinary circumstances" standard in light of particu-
lar facts in the suit pending.
When a statutory stay is introduced, but the standard for granting a
stay is as general as "extraordinary circumstances," the case law can simi-
larly establish a more detailed set of guidelines for the application of
statutory provisions, since the courts will treat a dismissal under the juris-
dictional approach and a statutory stay as the companion devices for a
deferral. In the United States, for example, federal courts tend to treat the
motion to stay as superfluous to the motion to dismiss. 309
VI. CONCLUSION
As compared and contrasted here, the similarities and differences
between the U.S. and Japanese parallel litigation practices are a reflection of
the underlying social and legal traditions. In both jurisdictions, where the
relevant laws and judicial systems are divergent, the litigants' motivations
for parallel litigation tend to be more legitimate. 310 The courts are more
likely to allow a parallel litigation where there are more legitimate
307 Kobayashi, supra note 189, at 41.
308 See supra part IV.A.
309 See supra part III.C.3.
310 See supra parts V.A. 1. & 2.
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motivations for parallel litigation.311 At the same time, however, the
possibility of negative effects compels the courts to restrict the parallel liti-
gation practice. 312
The Japanese domestic parallel litigation practice illustrates that,
when the level of homogeneity of the underlying social and legal foundation
reaches a certain level, the litigants' legitimacy for parallel litigation will
categorically be considered minimal. In this situation, the concern for
possible negative effects mandates the courts to uniformly prohibit parallel
litigation. 313 In contrast, where certain diversities exist, the courts have to
balance the legitimacy of motivations against the degree of negative effects
to determine whether or not to permit a parallel litigation. 314 To this end,
both the U.S. federal and Japanese judiciaries have endeavored to develop
an appropriate framework for the interest-balancing approach to interna-
tional parallel litigation. In the United States, the main framework is the
forum non conveniens analysis, 315 and in Japan it is the "extraordinary
circumstances" analysis.3 16
This comparative analysis between the U.S. and Japanese parallel
litigation practices indicates that an analysis based on the comparison
between legitimate motivation and negative effects 317 may be applied
universally. If this proves to be correct, the goals toward a transnational
harmonization of the international parallel litigation practices may be
achieved by refining the existing practice from the viewpoint of the
"legitimate motivation versus negative effect" analysis.
Once the harmonization is achieved to the extent that courts in differ-
ent countries apply the same standards and devices, the courts would be
able to cooperate internationally in identifying the most proper forum for a
dispute resolution. For example, a court may: (1) dismiss a litigation in
deference to a foreign litigation, (2) stay a litigation and monitor how a
foreign court will proceed, or (3) decline to defer to a foreign litigation. In
each case, the court is expressing its view as to which forum is more proper
for litigating the dispute. If the standards and devices are harmonized, the
311 Seesupra part'I.
312 See supra part 1.
313 See supra part W.A.i. The observation about the Brussels Convention confirms this
proposition. See supra notes 298-306 and accompanying text.
314 See supra part 1.
315 See supra part III.C. .
316 See supra part IV.A.2.
317 See supra part I.
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foreign court will easily understand the message from another court, and
will be obliged to pay due respect to that other court's view.
By exchanging their respective views, the courts will move from
merely questioning whether their forum is adequate to the more interesting
question of which is the appropriate forum. Ultimately, the courts of one
nation will find themselves in de facto cooperation with foreign courts in
search of the most appropriate forum.
